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Abstract 
 
Does the source of funding matter for the outcome of health care? The aim of this thesis is to 
analyze to what extent three different health care financing models affect the mortality from 
cardiovascular diseases. This is done by using OLS with PCSE, followed by two case studies to 
illustrate the findings. Based on two hypotheses the conclusion is that the National Health 
Service model and the Social Health Insurance model accounts for lower mortality rates than the 
Private Health Insurance model. The Social Health Insurance model additionally performs 
somewhat better than the National Health Service model. The extent of difference is, on the 
other hand, low, and the systems account for less than 1% of the differences in cardiovascular 
mortality. The case studies of Poland and Spain did neither present very clear changes in 
mortality rates affected by the change of financing model, which supports the overall conclusion.  
 
At the same time, it is argued that despite the small differences between the models, the extent 
of explanatory power of the models is high. This is because of the life expectancy in OECD 
countries is very high, and the postponing of death has a limit. The lack of very clear evidence 
from the case studies is argued to be due to the slow moving effects of health care, and there is 
not necessarily reason to expect that a clear decrease in mortality should automatically follow a 
change of system. There are also great differences in how the models are organized in the 
different countries, and poor implementation of a system, as arguably has been the case for the 
social health insurance in Poland, could easily outweigh the general benefits associated with a 
particular system. Additionally, there seems to be issues regarding model change, and many 
characteristics from the old systems are often kept within the new.  
 
Overall there is a significant correlation between the finance of health care systems and 
cardiovascular mortality, and given the premise of limited ways of reducing mortality in OECD 
countries, every improvement should be valued. This thesis therefore lays a solid framework for 
further discussion of health care policies in high-developed countries.  
 
Keywords: healthy policy, health care finance models, cardiovascular mortality, health insurance, 
national health service, social health insurance 
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1 Introduction 
 
All health care systems around the world face financial challenges. In the United States, for 
instance, this year’s election is the third in a row were the central issue is “Obamacare” 
(Schneider 2013). One of the reasons why this health care reform is so hard for many to accept 
is the idea of ‘individual mandate’, which requires all Americans to buy health coverage (Mooney 
2012 p. 61). Health care financing models is therefore a highly political topic, as indicated by the 
heated political rhetoric of American politicians:  
 
“Today America is threatened with a Stage Three cancer of 
socialism, and ObamaCare is Exhibit 1” (Rofsky 2013). 
Todd Akin, Former representative for the U.S. Congress 
 
In general, the importance of health care systems has increased during the 20th century by 
reducing the occurrence of premature death and improving the health of billions of people. 
Health care systems have additionally played a major role in the rise of life expectancy in high-
income countries (WHO 2000 p. 3). At the same time, this rise in life expectancy, together with 
the ageing of the population, have created an increase in expenses for the health care systems in 
developed countries (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 1). How this increase should be financed and 
distributed is a political question, and the role of the government in creating such distributions is 
of core concern of political science (Bradley et al. 2003 p. 193).  
 
1.1 Does the Source of Funding Matter?  
 
There are many examples of political campaigns being run on the question of how best to handle 
the rising health care costs, and more importantly, who should pay the bill. In 1992, the topic of 
health insurance, for instance, led Harris Wofford to victory in the Pennsylvanian Democratic 
primary for the U.S. senate. This made health insurance reform into a conspicuous issue in the 
presidential race, and a major concern for President Clinton’s agenda (Morone et al. 1994 p. 48). 
The debate about financing is central outside the U.S. as well:  
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“The current care and support system doesn’t work and is hugely unfair.  
People face losing almost everything they’ve worked hard for” (Ashley 2014). 
Norman Lamb, Minister of State for Care and Support, UK. 
 
The quote above illustrates the political debate of how health care systems should, or should not, 
be organized. Is the health care system better left to private markets or is health care a human 
right that the government should provide for its citizens? The common debate regards 
preventable diseases, lifestyle choices and limits of services offered. Less focus has been paid to 
whether or not the source of funding really matters for the average citizen. Do certain systems 
perform better than others?  
 
1.1.1 Different Models of Health Care Finance  
In this thesis, three different models1 of health care finance are carefully studied. These are the 
National Health Service (NHS), the Social Health Insurance (SHI) and the Private Health 
Insurance (PHI). The National Health Service is a tax financed model, a national system that 
covers the entire country’s population. The Social Health Insurance model is financed through 
insurance schemes, normally dependent on a person’s occupation, and covers the employee and 
her family (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 12). Primarily, the SHI system relies on payroll taxes as 
primary source of health care funding (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 10). The Private Health Insurance 
model operates with a private health insurance scheme, where it is every individual’s choice 
whether or not to enroll (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 12).   
 
The three models overlap with different political ideologies and traditions. In addition to the 
source of funding, they differ in regards of patient treatment, medicines, technologic 
development or initiatives related to surgery performance and preventive actions. In practice, 
however, all systems rely partly on public finance. In the OECD member countries, the health 
care sector is among the main expenses in the national economy (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 6). It is, 
at the same time, important to note that few countries fit into any single category, and the 
systems have developed their own financing over time (Glied 2008 p. 1).  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The term ’model’ and ’system’ when referring the NHS, SHI and PHI will be used interchangeably throughout the 
text.   
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1.1.2 Cardiovascular Diseases in the OECD  
The organization for economic co-operation and development (OECD) was created in 1961. In 
its member countries, the growth in health spending has exceeded the growth in GDP by a 
substantial amount in the last 50 years (OECD 2011 p. 5). This suggests that there is room to 
improve efficiency of health systems in order to ensure that the money spent on health provides 
measurable benefits in terms of health outcome (OECD 2011 p. 10). With health care taking up 
such a large share of national budgets, the question of policies’ influence on patient outcome is 
therefore highly appropriate.  
 
Cardiovascular diseases (CVD) are the number one cause of death in an average OECD country2 
(OECD 2011 p. 28). These numbers are likely to increase in the future, and CVDs are going to 
remain the leading cause of death (WHO 2013). This is mainly due to cardiovascular risk factors 
being lifestyle related, and the economic development of OECD countries have made lifestyle 
factors a central burden of disease (OECD 2011 p. 8). Mortality from cardiovascular diseases is 
therefore a relevant choice of measure in comparative research on the performance of health 
care financing models in the OECD countries. Using the OECD members as sample is partly 
due to the quality and quantity of available information, but also due to the causal link between 
poverty and health. In less developed countries it would not always be appropriate to talk about 
the existence health care systems. Moreover, poverty would naturally impact health care 
financing, but not because of an ageing population as is one of the challenges in high-income 
countries. 
 
1.1.3 Does the Source of Funding Matter?  
This thesis’ research question is therefore as follows:  
 
To what extent does the National Health Service model, the Social Health Insurance model and the 
Private Health Insurance model affect cardiovascular mortality in OECD countries?  
 
There are great differences between the systems in terms of finance and coverage, to list a few. 
This suggests, on the one hand, that there are important lessons to be learned by comparing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 In Canada, Denmark, France, Japan & the Netherlands, cancer is now the leading cause of death. Cancer, however, 
is the second leading cause of death in OECD-countries, after diseases of the circulatory system. Using CVDs as 
dependent variable would therefore cover a larger share of the mortality statistics than cancer. Additionally, there are 
more than 100 different types of cancers, with differences in treatment opportunities, and using CVDs would also 
have advantages in terms of methodological issues (OECD 2013).  	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performance across countries, as this study intends to do. At the same time, no scholar has so far 
been able to recognize any single system as being the most productive, or as having the right 
combination of regulation and competition (Baily & Garber 1997 p. 143). However, as health 
care systems account for a high and growing share of public budgets (OECD 2011 p. 16), it 
seems that governments may believe that spending more, publicly, on health care, would lead to 
better health outcomes. Additionally, due to the economic recession following the financial crisis 
of 2008, there has been an increase in government deficits in many countries. To justify public 
spending on the health sector, Health Ministries would therefore need proven benefits in terms 
of health outcomes if the health care sector should be protected or prioritized when control of 
public spending has to be done (OECD 2011 p. 16). More research on the topic is therefore 
highly needed, and the timing of this thesis is more than right.  
 
One clarification should be made: If one system does account for lower cardiovascular mortality 
than the others, this thesis would not be able to conclude about whether or not countries should 
adapt to this model. Firstly, this is because a government’s action at one point in time gives base 
for what the sensible next step in each individual country should be. Once a policy is established, 
various groups have a place in that policy, and interest structures become embedded in ways that 
would make the system difficult to change (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 72). Secondly, the thesis does 
not consider the cost, both in regards of finance and health, of system change. Major reform 
could potentially exceed the gains of the new model in many years to come. In this sample, 
change of models usually occurs after epochs of ‘high politics’ of ideological conflicts. Over the 
last 50 years only 13 countries have changed model, and this have mostly followed a transition 
from dictatorship to democracy. Finally, the effects of the financing models might affect other 
diseases than CVDs as well, but given the high share these diseases have in the countries 
mortality statistics, it is a very important factor to take into account.   
 
This thesis aim is to go beyond the political debate, and research the empirical outcome of the 
different political ideologies. This is important to create a framework for further discussion given 
the importance of health care systems in the OECD-countries society today.  
 
1.2 Findings  
The main findings of this thesis are that there are fairly small differences in outcome between the 
systems, but with the Social Health Insurance and National Health Service seemingly having 
lower cardiovascular mortality than the Private Health Insurance system. Additionally, the SHI 
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does perform slightly better than the NHS. There are, at the same time, insecurities about the 
extent of explanatory power between the models. When moving from the NHS to the SHI or 
PHI, the estimated difference in cardiovascular mortality is equivalent to less than 1%. This is 
supported by the regressions run with interpolated values3, where the differences between the 
models are close to zero. In the illustrative case studies on Spain and Poland, the effect of model 
change is additionally hard to spot.  
 
At the same time, it is argued that despite the small differences between the models, the extent 
of explanatory power of the models is high. This is because of the limits of a life and because 
when studying matters of life and death, every difference is important. The lack of very clear 
evidence from the case studies is argued to be due to the slow moving effects of health care, and 
there is not necessarily reason to expect that a clear decrease in mortality should automatically 
follow a change of system. There are also great differences in how the models are organized in 
the different countries, and poor implementation of a system, as arguably has been the case for 
the SHI system in Poland, could easily outweigh the general benefits associated with a particular 
system.  
 
1.3 Structure  
 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to health care in political science, before explaining the 
differences between the three health care models, and why this should matter in regards of 
cardiovascular mortality. Chapter 3 gives an overview of the data used, and the 
operationalization of the variables, before Chapter 4 explains the choice of methodology. In 
brief, the thesis mainly run ordinary least square (OLS) models, with panel corrected standard 
errors (PCSE), supplemented by, as mentioned, two illustrative case studies. The results from the 
regressions are presented in Chapter 5, followed by the case of Spain and the case of Poland, two 
countries that have changed health care systems over the last decades. Chapter 8 discusses the 
overall findings, before the conclusion is presented in Chapter 9.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The regressions run with interpolated values are not significant at a 0,1 level.  
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2 Theory  
 
 
This chapter explains why political economy and political science is a natural choice of discipline 
for this type of research project. It then gives a presentation of the three main health care 
financing models, before discussing different features of the models that affects cardiovascular 
mortality. Additionally, a fourth model, a communist model is presented, due to the fact that 
several of the OECD-countries were either part of the Soviet Union or under another form of 
communism in the time period of study in this thesis.  
 
2.1 The Politics of Health Care Financing Models 
 
The presence of health care in political science literature is not proportional to the size of health 
care in government activities (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 58). Additionally, the comparative health 
system literature in political science is based on typologies and models, and few articles are tied 
to theoretical frameworks (Albrecht, Fitzpatrick & Scrimshaw 1999 p. 442). This has great 
implications for the limits of theoretical framework this thesis could possibly build on. Using a 
political economy approach to health, however, is fruitful, since health is a result of social, 
political and economic structures (Birn, Pillay & Holtz 2009 p. 134). This means that to conclude 
on the choice of health care financing models impact on cardiovascular mortality, it is necessary 
to control for factors that cannot be explained by the health care systems themselves, such as 
democracy or GDP. Only one of the models used in this paper is fully funded by public sources, 
but all three systems are heavily shaped by government policy, both in regards of regulations and 
investments (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 61). In democracies, elected political representatives create 
government policy. The decision of which health care financing model to use is therefore 
influenced by voting behavior4 (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 67). Scholars of political science should 
therefore expand research on the topic.  
 
The National Health Service, Social Health Insurance and Private Health Insurance models, as 
described below, can be argued to represent very different political ideologies. The PHI model, 
as in the United States, represents a market-maximized approach to health care delivery 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 If voters were not able to influence public policy, there would be a severe crisis of democracy (Navarro et al. 2006 
p. 1033). This paper will not discuss this any further.  
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(Reichard 1996 p. 80). The NHS-model, like the one in Denmark, one the other hand, minimizes 
the role of the market, which represents the social market economy the country has. The SHI-
countries does additionally operate with a social market economy (Pontusson 2005 p. 81). It is 
therefore clear that health services are permeated by the social values of the different political 
systems, and that these values are responsible for the form health care institutions take (Reichard 
1996 p. 81). For instance, political parties with egalitarian ideologies tend to implement 
redistributive policies (Navarro et al. 2006 p. 1033). Redistribution is of great concern in the 
health care sector, and all three models do operate with some sort of risk-pooling (Normand & 
Weber 2009 p. 26). The ideology of the health care sector is, on the other hand, not the 
monopoly of political parties. It is, for instance, possible to identify the ideology of the medical 
profession or that of different health care administrators (Klein 1983 p. 84). The power of these 
third party actors differs between the models, and will be further touched upon in section 2.7. 
 
Additionally, the theory of path dependency is rather important in this thesis. Several of the 
countries changed financing model during the time period of study, and the illustrative cases 
presented in Chapter 6 and 7 show how part of the old models, or problems from the old 
models, is present within the new systems. At the same time, big health care reform is not the 
norm, and it is usually quite difficult to conduct. A path-dependent5 sequence of political 
changes is decisions tied to previous decisions and existing institutions. This means that 
structural forces dominate, and policy movement is most likely to be incremental (Wilsford 1994 
p. 252). This naturally applies to all behavior, but the main reason for including it here is because 
of the debate of structural features from old systems being kept when changing models, and to 
what extent this is an issue when operating with ideal models.  
 
This is also important for understanding why some countries change their model of health care 
funding, while others do not. This is because some systems are structurally more open to reform 
than others. For instance, in the U.S., the system is rather decentralized with a non-hierarchical 
network of autonomous decision-agents. This is in contrast of more centralized systems with 
hierarchical orders of less autonomous decision-agents, such as the one in Germany (Wilsford 
1994 p. 278). Centralized systems would be more open to change, since political agents have 
more control over the systems policies.  Even if the thesis operates with ideal models, it is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Path dependence in this thesis refers to the loose signal that the options available are constrained by previous 
choices, and does not rest on the more advanced understanding of the term from game theory and social choice 
theory were it is stressed that the same initial state may give different outcomes by different routes.  
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therefore important to note the systemic differences in the countries structures, and the 
implications this have when a change of model occurs.  
 
2.2 National Health Service  
 
“A comprehensive national health service [which would] ensure that for every citizen there is 
available whatever medical treatment he requires, in whatever form he requires it” (Pillay & 
Holtz 2009 p. 595). 
William Beveridge 
 
The first type of health care financing model presented is the National Health Service Model. 
Under this model, the state completely administers the health care services, and it owns or 
controls the delivery and production of them (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 13). There are four 
principles guiding the NHS (Scott 2001 p. 106). These are that access to health should be:  
 
1. Universal 
2. Comprehensive 
3. ‘Free at the point of delivery’ to the patient 
4. Financed primarily through general tax revenues   
 
Using a tax financed systems allows redistribution to be related to both risk and income (Scott 
2001 p. 19-20). At the same time, taxation systems are heterogeneous (Mossialos et al. 2002 p. 
14), but NHS systems stereotypically rely on general taxation from the central government level 
(Glied & Smith 2011 p. 10). In countries such as United Kingdom, Canada and Sweden, for 
example, government funding of health care comes from the general revenue raised by the 
central government (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 264). 
 
Some scholars (Glied & Smith 2011) operate explicitly with a model called National Health 
Insurance, which they separate from the National Health Service. The National Health Insurance 
is described as relying on taxation, but with the provision of services being under private practice 
(Glied & Smith 2011 p. 10). This is a most interesting debate in regards of what impact it might 
have on patient treatment and will be touched upon in section 2.7.1. The terms National Health 
System and National Health Insurance, however, is not consequently referring to the same 
division of systems. Sweden, for instance, is defined as NHS, but can also be referred to as “ a 
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national health insurance system introduced in 1946 that went into effect in 1955” (Immergut 
1992 p. 74). Since there is no clear development of National Health Insurance as an independent 
model, and the source of funding is through general taxation, this paper will not problematize 
this issue any further. The National Health Insurance will be considered as a variant of the 
National Health Service model, meaning that it will not be operationalized as a fourth model. 
This is mainly due to the narrow literature on the subject, and it would be a thesis in itself to 
classify which countries should be considered operationalized as using this model.  
 
Although the NHS is usually associated with the United Kingdom, it was actually New Zealand 
who established the first National Health Service (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 13). The British case, 
on the other hand, is most helpful in explaining the ideology behind the model. This is illustrated 
by the election in 1945, which brought the Labour Party into Government (Klein 2006 p. 19). 
The NHS was implemented after this victory, and built on the recommendations given in the 
Beveridge Report quoted above (Birn et al. 2009 p. 598). The NHS can be held as the greatest 
socialist accomplishment of the Labour Government (Klein 2006 p. 1). To understand the 
ideological foundations of the NHS, however, one needs to view it through the wider context of 
the prevailing political landscape. Fabian reformers6 like the Webbs, Liberals like Beveridge 
himself, and Tories like the Chamberlains all shared the belief in paternalistic knowledge (Klein 
1983 p. 87). There was, in other words, political consensus under the creation of the model 
(Klein 2006 p. 2), and the debate had little socialist ideology, and was more a debate about the 
administrative apparatus (Klein 2006 p. 20).  
 
In Europe, Margaret Thatcher became the figurehead of pro-market forces in the 1980s 
(Pontusson 2005 p. 1). Her agenda was to make the role of government to not do things for 
people, but rather create an environment in which people could do things for themselves (Klein 
1983 p. 83). In the attempt of reorganizing the NHS, however, she was forced to defend the 
principle of universal access to health care regardless of ability to pay, due to the U.K. 
population’s collective support for health care as a right (Birn et al. 2009 p. 599). This illustrates 
how politics, voters and parties, impact the models. This is also clear in Sweden, where the 
Conservative governments try to expand the private sector while the Social Democratic 
governments reduces it (Immergut 1992 p. 222).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The term Fabian reformers originate from the wars between Rome and Karthago, were the general Fabius’ strategy 
was to make very slow and cautious steps to win Rome back. In Britain the term ”Fabian Society” referce to 
socialist organization, which laid much of the fundation of the Labour Party (Cole 1961). 
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Concluding on the NHS as a socialist system would be a mistake. It is, as the name implies, 
rather nationalized (Doyal 1981 p. 37). It is important to clarify that this model has support from 
many political parties. Additionally, in a report from the British department of health and social 
security dated to 1976, it states that the prime responsibility of his or her health falls on the 
individual, and that the governments role is limited to ensuring access to knowledge on health, 
and at least not create hindrances for those who decide to act on this knowledge (Department of 
Health and Social Security 1976 p. 62-63).  
 
2.3 Social Health Insurance  
 
The second model presented is the Social Health Insurance Model. This model combines the 
principles of public mandate with separate funding (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 75). Establishment, 
supervision and administration are commonly viewed as a public task (Normand & Weber 2009 
p. 28). Some of the richest industrial nations have been brought about considerable degree of 
equality in the distribution of health services, due to the social insurance model (Breyer 1995 p. 
137). The model is based on a concept of social solidarity, and contributions are paid as a 
percentage of the salary rather than according to the specific health risks of the individual. The 
risk is usually shared between employers and employees. Dependents of employers are also 
covered, which in effect ensures population coverage (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 75).  
 
Social Health Insurance has no uniformly valid definition, but some characteristics are generally 
present. These are:  
 
1. Insured citizens pay a regular, usually wage-based contribution  
2. Independent associations manage and pay for health care 
3. Social Health Insurance is compulsory for the majority of the whole population 
4. There are several funds with variation in choice and risk-pooling 
5. Unemployed are usually covered through government sickness funds  
6. Employers and employees share responsibility for managing funds  
 
In summary, the key features of the SHI are that contributions are paid based on ability to pay 
and the system provides a separate, transparent system for the flow of finances from the 
contributors to the sickness funds (Mossialos et al. 2002 p. 60).  
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In regards of the health reforms in the Netherlands and New Zealand, the term social insurance 
assumes a different meaning. Social insurance refers in these cases to a public scheme in which 
individual tax contributions are pooled and financed health vouchers whose value is set in 
regards to levels of health risk and ability to pay. The vouchers allow individuals to purchase an 
insurance policy covering basic health care from a number of competing public and private 
insurers or purchasers (Scott 2001 p. 20). This is, however, not channeled through employment.   
 
In Europe, social health insurance has two distinct variants. One is the established systems of 
social health insurance in Western Europe, and the other are the former communist systems 
with newly established SHI models after the collapse of communism. In Western Europe the 
system have developed over a long time period, and many of the organizational features and 
regulatory relationships are the result of a process of adaptation to changing circumstances. In 
the former communist countries, on the other hand, the process of change has been more 
recent, radical and rapid. One of the main reasons why these countries decided on a SHI model 
is due to the separation between the insurer on the one hand, and the government on the other. 
This is supposed to bring greater approachability to the patient (Mossialos et al. 2002 p. 17). 
 
The SHI model originated in Germany in the nineteenth century, and Germany actually has the 
oldest universal health care system in the world (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 143). The earliest 
versions developed without any particular government intervention, and happened due to the 
large firms that were established in the era of industrialization. The workers in these firms 
organized themselves into trade unions, and when employers saw benefits in having healthy 
employees, they gave them support in creating sickness funds. In this way, a model was created 
where health insurance was provided for workers in firms, with the workers having much of the 
control. Some management and financial input, however, were left to the employers (Mossialos 
et al. 2002 p. 59). The different health insurance funds were organized along occupational, 
ethnic, religious, political, or geographical lines. In 1854, The Prussian Parliament formalized the 
system into law, requiring regular contributions from workers to be coordinated by their 
employers. Three decades later, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck introduced a series of social 
insurance programs. This was the start of the SHI model, which has later spread to several other 
countries. In 1985, 70 countries had adopted the German system (Birn et al. 2009 p. 595-596). 
The SHI therefore emerged from ideas of solidarity, but also a belief about health care leading to 
economic profit for the employers, and thereby the nation as a whole.  
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Later, between 1967 and 1986, 10 OECD countries abandoned the SHI in favor of the NHS 
model while at the same time all six of the OECD’s new European countries, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, abandoned their tax-financed, or communist, 
models in favor of the SHI (Wagstaff 2009 p. 3).  
 
2.4 Private Health Insurance  
 
As the name implies, the Private Health Insurance model is the model where the state is the least 
involved in direct funding of health care services. The main characteristic of the model is the 
purchase of private health insurance. This purchase is either done by the citizens themselves, or 
by their individual employers (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 12). This implies that the approach to 
regulation is driven by competition (Schmid, Cacace, Götze & Rothgang 2010 p. 471). What is 
emphasized is the notion that personal responsibility is the driver of individual action. Since the 
underlying ideology stress that freedom is the primary goal of society, government interference is 
kept at a minimum. Due to this health care is funded by the individual’s ability to pay, and 
collective action with government regulation is seen as a threat to freedom (Maynard 2013 p. 
1105).  At the same time, the PHI does leave room for a publicly funded safety net for 
vulnerable groups such as the poor, the young or the elderly. It is therefore important to clarify 
that the main assumption behind this model is that the main part of the funding of health care is 
best left to market forces (Blank & Burau 2010 p. 12).  
 
In this sample, the United States is the only nation that is categorized as using the Private Health 
Insurance model. Separating the country from the model is therefore difficult, if not impossible. 
This will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. One can speak of a fundamental difference in 
philosophy between the U.S. and the other OECD countries. The United States represents a 
strong individualism of a free market society, while many European countries are funded upon 
the deep egalitarianism of a social welfare state (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 3-4). It is therefore not 
surprising that these countries have chosen different financial models, but the issue arise when 
U.S. specific features is the only reference point for the model. For instance, the American 
approach to health care tends to be disease-focused, which creates a society where patients are 
viewed on background of their medical conditions, and not the other way around (Stulberg 
2014). This might have impact on the mortality from cardiovascular diseases in the U.S., but is 
not necessarily an intrinsical feature of the Private Insurance Model. There are, on the other 
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hand, insecurities about the operationalization of Switzerland, and a robustness test will be run 
where Switzerland is categorized as PHI until 1996.  
 
The private insurance model as operationalized in the U.S. is however a deprived model. When 
the insurance companies expand their markets, they are not looking for people in need of health 
care services, but instead customers who demand more services. Additionally, the insurance 
companies invest millions of dollars in political parties. This is done both to guarantee their 
immunity from state ownership, but also to retain state subsidies, which they need to stay 
profitably in business with minimal risk linked to the company. Despite the use of the PHI 
model, the U.S. spends just under 15% of GDP on public health care, compared with around 8-
9% in Western Europe (Hart 2006 p. 16-17). Operating with the PHI as main model is therefore 
not a guarantee of keeping public funding of health care at a minimum.  
 
One major political difference between this model and the two others is that the basic idea that 
health services are essential needs that people have the right to receive does not apply to the 
same extent. This is because it is in direct conflict with the idea of prices being the determinant 
of distribution of health care services (Sharp, Register & Leftwich 1994 p. 236). The PHI is in 
fact the only model were health care could be argued to be a byproduct. This is because the main 
goal of the insurance companies is the profit required to justify the business of either 
entrepreneur professional or corporate providers. Even when operating with health gain as a 
direct objective, it is never the only product (Hart 2010 p. 11).  
 
2.5 Hybrid Models  
 
It is quite common for several models to operate within one country. For instance, the phrase 
“national health insurance” in the United States, refers to government programs, such as 
Medicare and Medicaid, and other programs where government revenues are used to guarantee 
universal access to basic health care (Scott 2001 p. 20). In Germany, on the other hand, about 
10% of those who are covered by the SHI model, purchase supplementary insurance for instance 
for private hospital rooms (Birn et al. 2009 p. 596). Germany, together with Chile, remains the 
only countries in the sample where certain socio-economic groups can opt out of the otherwise 
compulsory social health insurance system and switch to a private insurance plan (Pütz & Hagist 
2006 p. 225). 
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One way of understanding hybrid models is to view them as a mild form of convergence. This 
means that because of the combination of financing models, the similarities between countries 
increase (Schmid et al. 2010 p. 456). This is important because having hybrid models increases 
the chance of similarities in the results between the countries.  
 
The PHI model is perhaps the most used as a hybrid, and governments often look to PHI as a 
possible means of facing some health system challenges, such as increasing system capacity 
(Colombo & Tapay 2004 p. 7). In the United Kingdom private insurance and private ownership 
of the elements of production are found (OECD 1987 p. 24), even though the country as a 
whole is never categorized as using the PHI model. In the OECD health care systems, the 
varying role of PHI does first of all root in historical roles of private health care and coverage 
(OECD 2004 p. 79). 
 
2.6 Communist Model  
 
As previously stated, the regression models are run with an alternative categorization of the 
countries, to test if the categorization of Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia 
and Poland as using a communist model, instead of categorizing them as NHS, would have 
impact on the results. A communist model would naturally have similarities with the NHS, given 
the role of the Government. There are, one the other hand, differences in the funding due to the 
role of the free market and the implications this has on taxation. Czechoslovakia, Poland and 
other Eastern European countries adopted some characteristics of the Soviet system, but all 
communist countries should in someway function differently from the NHS. The communist 
model was built on local councils, which were in charge of health care. These councils were 
under a central body, in charge of the entire system. Additionally, all the private hospitals, clinics, 
and pharmacies were nationalized. Poland is the exception in this case, and private provision was 
not completely abolished. This will be elaborated in Chapter 7. Central planning is one of the 
main characteristics of this model, and the national government estimated the numbers of health 
workers needed and placed personnel accordingly. Distributions of resources came from the top 
down. Still, as in many countries, the health system was marked by unequal quality across regions 
and remained underfunded through the entire age of communism (Birn et al. 2009 p. 600-601). 
Revenue for health care was generated mainly from the revenue of national enterprises, and due 
to the health care sector being considered ‘non-productive’, the overall public spending was low. 
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Despite this, most countries offered their population a comprehensive range of services 
(Mossialos et al. 2002 p. 83).  
 
In contrast to the stepwise creation of health care systems in, for instance, Germany and the UK, 
the Soviet system was born of radical transformation. The People’s Commissariat of Health 
Protection was established in July 1918 (Birn et al. 2009 p. 600). Due to the enormous territory 
and the variety of conditions, health commissariats were set up in a decentralized manner in each 
of the Soviet republics. Under the new Constitution of 1923, which was reaffirmed in 1936, the 
federal government established rules for the protection of health, with similar principles of 
Communist health care applied in all republics (Birn et al. 2009 p. 600).  
 
In countries from the former Soviet bloc, the health care systems had already begun to 
deteriorate in prior decades due to underinvestment, poor quality of care, corruption, and an 
overall shortage of resources (Birn et al. 2009 p. 611). In the aftermath, one of the biggest issues 
post-communist health care systems face, is the increase in use of out-of-pocket payments. This 
is clearly illustrated through the case of Poland later in the thesis. Before the transition, most of 
the former communist countries guaranteed free health care to their citizens (Mossialos et al. 
2002 p. 91). The communist welfare states additionally left a rare structural legacy based on full 
employment and enterprise-related benefits for the post-communist governments to address 
(Orenstein 2008 p. 83). This is, on the other hand, not a major problem in the countries in this 
sample (Mossialos et al. 2002 p. 91).  
 
2.7 Why Should the Models Affect Cardiovascular 
Mortality?  
 
The request of greater efficiency, fairness and responsiveness from health care systems has been 
outspoken during the 20th century and is still a goal today (WHO 2000 p. 13). Given the political 
debate about their financing, it is important to answer why they, theoretically, should affect 
mortality. This section discusses how the three models differ in regards of universal coverage, 
equity and quality and quantity of services provided. These are to a great extent overlapping 
topics, but the thesis has found the sectioning very beneficial when explaining the causal chains 
between the models and cardiovascular mortality rates. Additionally, the sustainability of the 
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models is implemented in the debate, since potential existence of unsustainable mechanisms 
would highly impact the models future.  
 
2.7.1 Universal Coverage 
 
Figure 2.1: Causal Chain of Universal Coverage on Cardiovascular Mortality. This figure shows the causal 
implications of why universal coverage should affect cardiovascular mortality.  
 
Universal coverage can be defined as access to health care services at an affordable price. This 
would include the criteria of population coverage, but the provision of both quality and a decent 
quantity of services for essential needs must additionally be offered (Normand & Weber 2009 p. 
31). The implementation of universal coverage, however, is a political rather than a technical 
issue (Stuckler et al. 2010 p. 2). This is partly because providing full coverage would include both 
those who can afford to pay for health care, but also those who cannot (Sharp et al. 1994 p. 250). 
The reason why universal coverage affects cardiovascular mortality is because not having health 
care coverage has evident consequences for health status. In the United States, for instance, 
those who are not covered by insurance receive fewer preventive and diagnostic services and 
tend to be very ill when diagnosed (Carrin 2009 p. 233). As the name ‘preventive care’ suggests, 
it is because of this effect that universal coverage is so important for the mortality of 
cardiovascular diseases. 7 The causal chain is therefore that universal coverage provides health 
care access at an affordable cost, which then again leads to preventive treatment that lowers 
cardiovascular mortality.  
 
In regards of population coverage the rule of thumb is that countries using the NHS offer 
coverage to their populations (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 143). This is, as mentioned, one of the 
main features of the NHS model. In Spain however, who changed to the NHS model in 1986, 
the population coverage is not 100%, and it is important to note that the models do leave room 
for such special arrangements. This will be further discussed in Chapter 6. In regards of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is important to stress that access to medical treatment cannot explain all patterns of health status. Health 
services offer treatment for disease, and procedures cannot prevent many chronic conditions or genetic factors 
(Robinson 2007 p. 531).  
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preventive care it is, at the same time, not possible to conclude on the amount of preventive care 
that is offered, since the nations does not require their citizens to see a doctor. The argument 
about population coverage leading to more preventive care is therefore based on the assumption 
of the probability of seeing a doctor being higher when the patients have the possibility of seeing 
a doctor.  
 
Adopting the SHI model is also a common way of establishing population coverage, but the 
process might be long. Belgium, for instance, used 118 years from the first social health 
insurance laws were implemented to population coverage was achieved. Korea, on the other 
hand, used 26 years (Carrin & James 2005). This is because while the NHS offers population 
coverage from the very beginning, the SHI often operates as a voluntary system in a transitional 
stage (Normand & Weber 2009 p. 27). The model is therefore not always compulsory, and in 
such countries there would not be full population coverage. At the same time, the political 
motivation for implementing population coverage is clear in both the NHS and SHI. Germany, 
who is operationalized as using the SHI model, is a social market economy, which is based on a 
fundamental principle of solidarity. This is a belief of providing needs for all citizens would be 
both desirable and beneficial for the society (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 143).  
 
The PHI, as operationalized in the United States, shows a different picture. 47 million people 
were uninsured in 2013, and millions more were underinsured (Seipel 2013 p. 54). Despite 
viewing mean values of mortality, high numbers of people outside the health care system, should 
theoretically affect the regression results negatively. It is though important to note the effect 
variance of only operating with the U.S. as using the PHI.  
 
On behalf of this, one should expect the PHI model to affect the mean cardiovascular mortality 
more negatively than the two other models. In contrast to the solidarity and economic argument 
of population coverage behind the NHS and SHI, the PHI has another ideological reasoning. In 
the U.S., one of the challenges is linked to attitudes about social groups. Behavioral indicators 
are most important for Americans opinions about universal coverage of health care. This is more 
important than both race and class-related topics. Beliefs about groups and behaviors, on the 
other hand, are intertwined (Gollust & Lynch 2011 p. 1063). The public opinion behind the PHI 
in this sample is therefore that behavior determines right to care, rather than viewing care as a 
right of all citizens.  
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At the same time, the definition of universality also includes provision of services of essential 
needs. In practice, many countries promise universal coverage, while they, at the same time, 
ration care or have long waiting lists for treatment (Tanner 2008 p. 34).  Waiting lines certainly 
became a common complaint about public health services in the United Kingdom, Sweden, and 
other countries in the 1980s (Pontusson 2005 p. 188), and the picture is still the same. In 
Denmark, for instance, the wait to see a specialist and the wait for elective surgery can 
sometimes be dragged on for weeks or sometimes even months (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 8). 
The NHS model has been severely criticized for this, but it is additionally a challenge in the SHI. 
Implementing he PHI, on the other hand, creates quicker access to care. Additionally, 
encouraging the development of the PHI as a hybrid model has been used as a way of reducing 
waiting time in public systems. In France, for instance, the private health care sector have helped 
to finance doctors and hospital treatments, when the SHI has fallen short (OECD 2004 p.  177-
178). Those who are covered under the PHI would therefore have faster access to care or 
specialist treatment, which would indicate less severe conditions when treatment is provided.   
 
Another aspect that is interesting in regards of universal coverage is the notion about access at 
an affordable cost. In Norway, for instance, the Conservative party has proposed the possibility 
of free choice of treatment at the government’s expense, as a way of shortening the waiting lines 
(Høyre 2013 p. 26). This is in no way contradictory to the NHS model, since the funding would 
still be public, but utilizing health care services outside the public sector would help the model to 
reach the broader understanding of universal coverage for the citizens. Having such 
arrangements would therefore compensate for the negative effects discussed above.  
 
One can therefore conclude that in regards of population coverage, the NHS performs better 
than the two other models. This is mainly due to the long time span there might be between the 
implementation of SHI and completion of population coverage. In the OECD-countries 
however, this is mainly a problem of the past, and one should therefore expect small differences 
between the two models. It is therefore especially the PHI who is expected to account for higher 
mortality rates due to the lack of population coverage. In regards of provision of access to 
essential services at an affordable cost both the NHS and SHI struggles with the problem of 
waiting lists. At the same time, the reason why many people is not covered under the PHI is 
exactly due to the affordability of insurance, where the price of health insurance is based on 
health risks (Normand & Weber 2009 p. 27). Lack of waiting lists would therefore not benefit 
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the overall conclusion of universal coverage, and provision of access at an affordable cost seems 
to be a challenge in all three models.  
 
2.7.2 Equity 
 
Figure 2.2: Causal chain of Equity on Cardiovascular Mortality. This figure shows the main causal mechanisms of 
why equity should affect cardiovascular mortality.  
 
The definition of equity in health care is that differences between groups of people that can be 
avoided, or other differences than can somehow be corrected, is absent (WHO undated b). The 
question of equity therefore overlaps with the discussion about universal coverage. To figure out 
if a financing model is equitable assumes that equity is a relative and not an absolute category 
(Saltman p. 105), since one is discussing degrees of equity. The causal chain between equity and 
cardiovascular mortality is thus that redistributive policies must be implemented to prevent 
avoidable differences between people, and this would again create a security net, which would 
lower cardiovascular mortality.   
 
While the distribution of health care delivery varies between the models, all OECD-countries 
implement some form of policies to redistribute resources to increase the equity in distribution 
of health care (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 59). Redistributive policies are positively associated with 
health outcomes (Navarro et al. 2006 p. 1035). The NHS model shifts almost the entire burden 
of health care costs to the government and redistributes income from taxpayers to the users of 
health services (Sharp et al. 1994 p. 250). Again, in Denmark, all citizens have equal access to 
health services (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 12).  
 
Redistributive policies are, as mentioned, positively linked to health outcome (Navarro et al. 
2006 p. 1035). All the OECD-countries have implemented some form of redistributive health 
care policies to increase equity, but there is variation between the models (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 
59). In the NHS model the distribution operates through the taxation system, by giving the 
Equity 
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government almost the entire cost of health care. The population would therefore normally not 
pay for services directly (Sharp et at. 1994 p. 250). Again, in Denmark, every citizen has equal 
access to health services (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 12), and the provision of services does not 
depend on the individuals’ economic contribution.  
 
The same goes for the SHI model, were the system separates payments from people with 
different estimated risk levels and redistributes wealth from individuals with low expectations of 
risk, to those with higher levels of risk (Scott 2001 p. 19). The key difference from the NHS 
model is that entitlements to services is based on payment of contribution, which are earmarked, 
pooled, and administrated in a separate budget (Normand & Weber 2009 p. 27). Even though 
services are based on contribution, most systems operate with a security net for those who are 
outside the workforce. This is illustrated in Poland in Chapter 7.   
 
As one can tell, both the SHI and NHS have all the causal mechanisms from equity to lower 
cardiovascular mortality. There is, however, a difference between the systems that might affect 
equity. In Germany, for example, the development of the social health insurance funds has been 
very fragmented. They consist of a great number of actors, which often have competing 
interests. All these actors are involved in negotiations of health care system structuring. 
Additionally, many actors maintain separate funds for agricultural workers or the self-employed. 
If such fragmented funding systems are not properly regulated by government agencies, it might 
lead to inequities among groups of beneficiaries. This is because the different funds can entrench 
competing plans (Birn et al. 2009 p. 597). Another factor that possibly lower the equity in the 
SHI is that in Germany and the Netherlands higher income earners is allowed to opt out of the 
scheme (Saltman, Busse & Figueras 2004 p. 108). This would remove more affluent people from 
the funds, which would result in lower levels of redistribution.  
 
As mentioned, it is not contrary to the PHI model to operate with a security net for some groups 
of the population. The United States, for instance, operates with programs, which offer 
important help with health care costs and services to those who are unable to pay. At the same 
time, not all form of security nets can be measured through government activities, and 
Americans have high levels of volunteerism, and privately contribute money and time to 
thousands of organizations that focus on health needs and research (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 
12).  
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The reasoning behind this difference between on the one hand the PHI, and the NHS and SHI 
on the other, in regards of equity, is found in the ideological fundaments the models build on. 
The PHI operates on a belief of the importance of personal responsibility for moral well-being. 
Unearned rewards are therefore seen as weakening the motives, which assures economic well-
being. The NHS and SHI do not link economic failure with moral depravity in this way. The 
importance of personal responsibility does therefore triumph over the equality of opportunity 
that the SHI and NHS focus on (Maynard 2013 p. 1106-1107).  
 
In regards of equity, one should still expect small differences between the models. The main 
argument for equity is operating with a security net, and in this regard all three systems would 
perform similar. This is despite the overlap between the topic of universalism, since a security 
net is a looser term than universal coverage, and does not necessarily require coverage of all 
essential needs.  
 
2.7.3 Quality and Quantity of Services Provided  
 
The problems with measuring health systems impact on mortality from cardiovascular diseases 
on the base of equity, is the fact that full equity exists if everyone is equitably worse of. The 
absence of avoidable differences does not automatically mean that the services provided are of 
high quality, or that the quantity of services is sufficient to cover all cardiovascular health 
concerns. This also overlaps with universal coverage, since a certain quantity of services must be 
provided to meet requirements in the definition, and would therefore also have political 
implications in the countries were the government decide which services that should be covered. 
Access to services of essential needs does not, however, imply much about the quality of these 
services. Moreover, it is important to note that the causal chain presented below does not debate 
if a high quantity, for instance, affect the quality of services negatively. The causal chain applies 
when both the quality and the quantity of services are at a high level.8 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 One should note that stressing the quality of services as a problem is of little use if providers cannot find a low 
cost way provide services of high quality. See Øvretveit (2002) for further detail.  
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Figure 2.3: Causal Chain of High Quality and Quantity of Services on Cardiovascular Mortality.  
 
There are several concerns in this debate. Firstly, it is difficult to decide on which quantity of 
health care services that are essential to good health. This issue is of highest importance in the 
NHS, since it is up to the government to decide on what services should be offered. Most 
systems, however, cover a wide range of services (Sharp et al. 1994 p. 250). As societal norms 
change, it is far from obvious where to draw the line between “frivolous” and essential health 
care needs (Pontusson 2005 p. 188). This is shown in the models where the PHI believes that 
the individuals themselves knows best what kind of welfare they need, and a market approach to 
health argues therefore that the services offered are the services needed. The NHS and SHI, on 
the other hand, argue that individuals do not know what welfare they need when they are sick 
(Maynard 2013 p. 1109), and other instances should therefore decide on which services to 
provide. 
 
It has further been argued that the NHS system and quality of care is incompatible (Seipel 2013 
p. 56). Providing a wide range of health care for all citizens requires a strong financial 
commitment to having high taxes (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 313). Additionally, the NHS could 
never meet the demands for health care conceivable in a consumer market. This is because as the 
patients climb up the socioeconomic ladder, the demand for service rise, and patients expect 
more treatment than what is sometimes provided (Hart 2006 p 7). Additionally, as new forms of 
treatment and new technology are available, the expectations of the health care system increase. 
This has implications for the funding. In Sweden, for instance, the health care system is not 
sustainable without a further rise in tax levels, and even government officials acknowledge that 
taxes are at the maximum and cannot go higher without repercussions (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 
314). Given the ageing of the population, this is a severe challenge to the NHS model. At the 
same time, as people with less severe conditions seek treatment, waiting times will rise even 
further than the current level, and the only way of reducing wait times is by increasing taxation9 
(Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 9). Both the ageing of the population and higher demands of what the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It is possible to speculate about developing more effective ways of treatment, or developing more cost-effective 
methods, but this debate falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
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system can offer is therefore challenging to the financing of the NHS model. It appears difficult, 
if not impossible, to limit the annual increases in health care costs while at the same time 
providing a high quality and quantity of services (Sharp et al. 1994 p. 249).  
 
A backside of high taxes is the danger of young college graduates and other workers to lose 
motivation to work, or seek careers outside the country (Armstrong et al. 2011 p. 314). If this is 
the case, the best doctors might leave the country if offered jobs in countries with lower tax 
levels. This hypothetical scenario would naturally lead to lower quality of services. Additionally, if 
it is possible for high-income earners to seek treatment outside of the system, their willingness to 
pay taxes, which support the system, are bound to diminish (Pontusson 2005 p. 189). Across the 
OECD, about 15 percent of all tax revenue is devoted to health care. This proportion is steadily 
increasing, and varies among the members. The distribution of tax revenue through health care 
requires much regulation. This is regulation of provider prices and organizations, but also a 
regulation of quality (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 61). This is in many ways a debate about the 
sustainable development of the system, and having to rely on the general revenue is a challenge 
for the future of the NHS. Even though the SHI leaves room for public funding, it does not 
compete directly for a share of the public budget like the NHS does (Normand & Weber 2009 p. 
25), and the challenge is therefore somewhat diminished.  
 
Taxes and public spending is a clear advantage of the PHI model in regards of sustainability. 
Additionally, the private sector may have the ability to find more approachable and efficient 
answers to policy challenges facing health systems, and could possibly permit governments to cut 
public health sector costs (OECD 2004 p. 170). The underlying argument for using PHI is 
precisely that the market is best at finding solutions (Birn et al. 2009 p. 540). The problem is that 
the assumption of the price of a service being determined by demand for that service, does not 
necessarily apply to health care. Firstly, the patient cannot control when or how to purchase 
services (Birn et al. 2009 p. 541). Consumers are probably less informed about medical services 
than about anything else they buy (Sharp et al. 1994 p. 235). At the same time, once the decision 
of entering the health care system is made, the patient does not have control of further costs, 
since the physician controls the medical decisions because of her specialized knowledge. In a 
way, suppliers can therefore create their own demand (Birn et al. 2009 p. 542). A continuing of 
this information gap is not sustainable. An established function of government in health care has 
been to redress information gaps through regulatory action. The complexity of biological 
processes means that consumers face very high information costs in assessing the health 
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implications of various goods and services, and may be vulnerable to undue influence from 
providers (Glied & Smith 2011 p.  59). These information asymmetries remain, despite efforts to 
improve public understanding of health (Normand & Weber 2009 p. 25). 
 
If government regulations do diminish the quality of care, the NHS model is expected to 
perform poorer than both the SHI and PHI. The PHI, for instance, view profit as an effective 
way of motivating suppliers to respond to demanders needs (Maynard 2013 p. 1108). On the 
other hand, the two models often limit health care supply, including the provision of some kinds 
of care, only to specific age groups. For instance, in Minnesota health insurance could be denied 
due to preexisting conditions. This is, on the other hand, eliminated in the Affordable Care Act 
(Health Reform Minnesota 2014). This type of problem is typically overlooked or minimized in 
NHS systems (Ferguson & Leistikow 2000 p. 14).  
 
As previously mentioned, the NHS, but also the SHI struggles with long waiting lists for health 
services. This is a torn in both the quality and quantity of care. The PHI, on the other hand, is a 
way to increase system capacity (Colombus & Tapay 2004 p. 7). This is because of the above-
mentioned motivation of profit and the strong incentives suppliers have of adopting least-cost 
methods of provision (Maynard 2013 p. 1108). When it comes to productivity and system 
capacity, the PHI system has often financed the delivery of larger treatment volumes by offering 
higher payments to providers. Financial incentives linked to payment mechanisms exert a direct 
impact upon doctor’s productivity (OECD 2004 p. 178). This is also the case for the SHI, where 
the autonomy of providers and the development of explicit purchasing arrangements are 
measures that are used to increase the efficiency in the health care system (Normand & Weber 
2009 p. 28-29).  
 
Logically, the doctors in the PHI should therefore have incentive to treat more patients 
compared with the NHS, which would again lead to a healthier outcome. Based on this logic the 
doctors would additionally have initiatives to treat patients at and early stage, since preventive 
care is less expensive. At the same time, varying amounts of money charged for health services, 
in the PHI, may go to purposes having no health benefit at all. According to insurance 
companies, separating clinical decisions from financial considerations means physicians have 
little incentive to save. In fact, they may have strong motivations for overuse and ‘provide a 
maximum level of services.’ The policies of the health insurance funds are therefore important in 
controlling direct expenditures (Birn et al. 2009 p. 542). Some medical procedures are patently 
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useless, others surely dangerous. Evidence show that in the U.S. heart attack patients is almost 
eight times as likely to undergo coronary-artery bypass surgery compared to their Canadian 
counterparts. There are, however, no differences between the patients in long-term outcomes 
(Birn et al. 2009 p. 543). The study, however, does not take lifestyle factors into account, and 
there is neither any information provided about the patient’s health status before the surgery was 
performed.  
 
These wasteful initiatives that exists in the PHI is absent in both the NHS and SHI. The SHI can 
actually help to increase patients’ rights as clienteles of health care providers. The transparency 
of prices, costs & expenditure is also greater compared to the PHI (Normand & Weber 2009 p. 
28). So even though the SHI to some extent struggle with waiting lists, the system do benefit 
from the positive effects of operating with insurance schemes. The effect of health insurance is, 
overall, to move consumers down their respective individual demand curves, resulting in an 
increase in market demand, that is, an increase in the quantity demanded at any given price 
(Sharp et al. 1994 p. 256).  
 
On the other hand, the SHI model does face some issues. In the polish case discussed in 
Chapter 7, for instance, there are several limitations to services due to low funding of the sector. 
It also struggles with conflicts against low salaries of young doctors and nurses in combination 
of weak governance within the sector (Golinowska & Kozierkiewicz 2008 p .84). This is mainly a 
specific problem linked to Poland, but the system does not offer mechanisms to capture such 
problems. The SHI may also require more administrative effort to register workers in the 
informal sector and to collect contributions from them (Normand & Weber 2009 p. 29).  
 
Additionally, the PHI, as operationalized in the United States, experiences an uneven quality of 
health care distribution. The poor and minorities have problems with gaining access to health 
care, and when they do, the services provided are not always of a high quality (Seipel 2013 p. 55). 
The role of third party actors might also offer some issues for the PHI. For instance, the health 
care industry and providers of health care have delivered amazing technological advances, but 
are also distinctively powerful interest groups. There are often formidable pressures to adopt 
new technologies before proper evaluation is possible (Glied & Smith 2011 p. 1). In regards of 
quality and quantity, the SHI is therefore expected to be the most favorable model.  
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2.7.4 Hypotheses  
The discussion above examines the universal coverage, equity and quality and quantity of 
services provided in the NHS, SHI and PHI. The NHS, closely followed by the SHI is 
theoretically supposed to perform better than the PHI, in regards of universal coverage. The two 
other discussions overlap with this discussion, and the disadvantage of the PHI is therefore 
further strengthened.   
 
 The first hypothesis of this thesis is therefore:  
 
 H1: The NHS and SHI have lower cardiovascular mortality rates than the PHI.  
 
There are however differences between the NHS and SHI. Even though the SHI might not 
implement universal coverage immediately as the NHS does, this is not a major concern in the 
sample of this thesis. The models are therefore expected to offer similar levels of universal 
coverage. At the same time, all models are expected to perform similar in regards of equity. 
Given the problems the NHS face in the competition of resources from the national revenue, 
combined with the positive effects of operating with an insurance scheme, the SHI should 
therefore have some benefits when compared to the NHS.  
 
The second hypothesis of this thesis is therefore:  
 
 H2: The SHI performs somewhat better than the NHS in the OECD countries.  
 
These hypotheses will be tested through the regressions run in Chapter 5. 
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3 Data and Operationalization  
 
This chapter presents the data used in this thesis, and explains how the different variables are 
operationalized.  
 
3.1 Sample  
 
The sample consists of the OECD-countries, and they are studied in the time period 1960-2011. 
There are several exceptions from this rule. Due to lack of data on the dependent variable, 
Turkey is not included in the regressions. Some of the countries have undergone major changes 
between 1960 and 2011. Germany was separated in two countries until the reunification in 1990. 
Estonia, on the other hand, were part of the Soviet Union until 1991, just as Slovenia was a 
member of Yugoslavia until 1991. Czech Republic and Slovakia, on the other hand, were one 
country, Czechoslovakia, until 1992.This has impact on the availability of data for the separate 
countries, which will be discussed later in this chapter. The OECD’s data for Israel is collected 
by the Israeli government and does not position on the status of the Golan Heights, East 
Jerusalem and Israeli settlements in the West Bank.  
 
3.2 Dependent Variable  
 
The dependent variable of this study is mortality from cardiovascular diseases (CVD). 
Cardiovascular disease is a broad term, which covers pathologic processes affecting the entire 
arterial circulation. This means that many different diseases such as stroke, transient ischemic 
attacks, angina, myocardial infarction, and critical limb ischemia are defined as CVDs (Wilson & 
Douglas 2013). This study operates with four variables to measure the mortality caused by 
CVDs. These are mortality from diseases of the circulatory system, mortality from ischaemic 
heart disease (IHD), mortality from acute myocardial infarction (AMI) and mortality from 
cerebrovascular disease. All four variables are collected from OECD’s own statistical database 
(OECD Stats undated), and measured in number of deaths per 100 000 population. This is an 
age-standardized rate, where 2010 is used as the reference population. The computing of the rate 
can be found in appendix 3 together with an overview of break in series of each of the OECD 
countries. The OECD classifies the variables using the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD) system, and a full overview of the coding is provided in appendix 2.  
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The first variable, mortality from diseases of the circulatory system, includes all diseases in the 
circulatory organs, which is the heart and the vessels. This is a broad definition of cardiovascular 
diseases.10 The definition covers all major cardiovascular diseases, and would, for instance, 
consist of coronary heart disease, which is the most common cardiovascular disease, but also of 
stroke and other diseases related to the heart and the veins. IHD and stroke were responsible for 
most of the mortality due to cardiovascular diseases in 2009 (García-Armesto et al. 2010 p. 15), 
and half of the cases of CVDs are in the ischaemic heart disease category (Wilson 2014). Using 
such a broad definition would therefore be a solid approach, since it would contain all major 
diseases, and thereby also the largest budgetary expenses.  
 
Mortality from ischaemic heart disease11, which forms the basis of the second measure, is 
diseases of the blood vessels supplying the heart muscle (WHO 2013). IHD is manifested by 
myocardial infarction, angina pectoris, hearth failure and coronary death (Wilson 2014). The 
third variable, mortality from Acute Myocardial Infarction, more commonly known as heart 
attack, is therefore a subcategory of ischaemic heart disease. To classify as myocardial infarction 
the blockage must occur in one of the arteries of the heart muscle itself – a coronary artery. All 
ischaemic heart diseases are the result of the oxygen carried in the blood being inadequate to 
sustain muscle. Muscle has a very high metabolic rate and oxygen demand, and requires a lot of 
blood. Ischaemic can loosely be translated to ‘not enough blood’ (Des Moines University 
undated). In 2009, IHD alone was responsible for an average of 15% of all deaths in OECD 
countries (OECD 2011 p. 28). These two variables capture the single largest group of 
cardiovascular diseases, and the results from regressions using these two measures would 
therefore have strong concept validity.  
 
The fourth variable used to measure cardiovascular mortality is mortality from cerebrovascular 
disease. This is diseases of the blood vessels supplying the brain (WHO 2013), and is manifested 
by stroke and transient ischemic attack (Wilson 2014). Using these four variables will therefore 
provide a solid concept validity of CVDs.  
 
Even though diseases of the circulatory system offer the broadest measure of cardiovascular 
mortality, it is not said that the results from this regressions is the best measure on the impact of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 There are also other cardiovascular diseases, not included in the ICD codes used as definition of diseases of the 
circulatory system. These illnesses, however, is not a direct cause of mortality. See Folkehelseinstituttet (2014) for 
further information.  
11 Ischaemic heart disease can also be labeled coronary heart disease (Kannam, Aroesty & Gersh 2014). 
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the models. The main risk factors for cardiovascular diseases that can be treated or prevented by 
the different health care systems are obesity, high blood pressure, diabetes and raised lipids. 
Other risk factors, such as an unhealthy diet and physical inactivity, usually show up in 
individuals through these four factors (WHO 2013). In regards of ischaemic heart disease, 90% 
of events occur in individuals with at least one risk factor present (Wilson 2014). Having lower 
mortality rates therefore indicates that the system additionally is good at preventative measures. 
At the same time, given the high amount of behavioral choices, the health care financing models 
explanatory power over cardiovascular mortality should be highest in regards of mortality from 
acute myocardial infarction, precisely due to the acuteness limiting the long-term explanations. 
This is also the case when viewing the system changes in Spain and Poland, and is due to the 
acuteness of treatment.   
 
3.3 Independent Variable 
 
This study operates, as discussed, with three main health care financing models, the NHS, SHI 
and PHI, and the regressions are additionally run with a fourth category to control for the 
communist model (CHS) used in some of the countries up until the 1990s. The regressions with 
three categories are referred to as Model 1, while the regressions with four categories are referred 
to as Model 2.  
 
Most studies on health care financing do operationalize the countries into the three different 
systems. The problem is, that very few articles puts the systems into a historic context, and often 
studying cross sections at only one point in time. It is therefore difficult to find a throughout list 
of the historic development of the models in OECD countries that covers the entire epoch from 
1960 to 2011. 
 
Saltman, Busse & Figueras (2004) have categorized almost all the European countries for the 
time period of research. Compared to major scholarly writings, the citation rate is modest, but 
this seem to be the case for all similar articles. The questions about this source’ reliability, on the 
other hand, is not urgent, given the fact that it is published in cooperation with the WHO, on 
behalf of the European Observatory of Health Systems and Policies. Additionally, there is an 
advantage to use a source that have operationalized many countries, since this would create a 
consistency in the logic behind the categorizations, which again would lead to higher reliability of 
the operationalizations in this thesis.  
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The categorizations of Canada, the U.S., Mexico, Chile, Korea12 and Japan is found in Carrin’s 
book Health Systems Policy, Finance, and Organization (2009). This book additionally indicates that 
there have been no major changes in health care financing models in later years. Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras operationalizations from 2004 are therefore still valid. There are neither any changes 
in later years, to the author’s knowledge at least.  
 
New Zealand & Australia are categorized by Blank & Burau (2010). This is a textbook in 
comparative health care policy, and has similar citation rates as the previous works. For the three 
remaining countries, Slovenia, Israel and Turkey, the thesis has turned to the Health Systems in 
Transition series. These are indebt analysis of the different countries conducted by the WHO.   
 
Table 3.1 Operationalization of the Independent Variable 
Country Source Model 1 Model 2 
  NHS SHI PHI CHS NHS SHI PHI 
Australia  Blank & Burau 
2010 p. 73 
1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
  
Austria  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Belgium  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Canada  Carrin 2009 p. 
150 
1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
  
Chile  Carrin 2009 p. 
217 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Czech 
Republic  
Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
2004 p. 3 
1960-
1991 
1992-
2013 
 1960-
1991 
 1992-
2013 
 
Denmark  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1973-
2013 
1960-
1972 
  1973-
2013 
1960-
1972 
 
Estonia  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 3 
1960-
1991 
1992-
2013 
 1960-
1991 
 1992-
2013 
 
Finland  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
  
France  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Germany  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Greece  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1983-
2013 
1960-
1982 
  1983-
2013 
1960-
1982 
 
Table 3.1: Continues on page 31.  	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  Korea refers in this thesis to the Republic of Korea and not the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.	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Hungary  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 
2004 p. 3 
1960-
1988 
1989-
2013 
  1960-
1988 
1989-
2013 
 
Iceland  Carrin 2009 p. 
150 
1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
  
Ireland  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
  
Israel  Rosen & Merkur 
2009 p. 42 
1995-
2013 
1960-
1994 
  1995-
2013 
1960-
1994 
 
Italy  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1973-
2013 
1960-
1972 
  1973-
2913 
1960-
1972 
 
Japan  Carrin 2009 p. 
150 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Luxembourg  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Mexico  Carrin 2009 p. 
218 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Netherlands  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
New Zealand  Blank & Burau 
2010 p. 17 
1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
  
Norway  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1967-
2013 
1960-
1966  
  1967-
2013 
1960-
1966  
 
Poland  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 3 
1960-
1998 
1999-
2013 
 1960-
1998 
 1999-
2013 
 
Portugal  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1979-
2013 
1960-
1978 
  1979-
2013 
1960-
1978 
 
Republic of 
Korea  
Carrin 2009 p. 
229 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Slovak 
Republic  
Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 3 
1960-
1993 
1994-
2013 
 1960-
1993 
 1994-
2013 
 
Slovenia  Albreht et al. 
2009 p. 37 
1960-
1991 
1992-
2013 
 1960-
1991 
 1992-
2013 
 
Spain  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1986-
2013 
1960-
1985 
  1986-
2013 
1960-
2013 
 
Sweden  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
  
Switzerland  Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
Turkey  Tatar et al. 2011 
p. 37 
 1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
 
United 
Kingdom  
Saltman, Busse 
& Figueras 2004 
p. 26 
1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
  
United States  Carrin 2009 p. 
227 
  1960-
2013 
   1960-
2013 
Table 3.1: Overview of the categorization of OECD-countries on the independent variable. The table shows the 
operationalization both Model 1, with three categories, and Model 2, with four categories.   
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The manual scoring of the independent variable was done with high precision, and the reliability 
is therefore considered high. The low variety in sources used in the operationalization 
contributes to a heightening of the concept validity, since it limits the possible variation between 
different scholars definitions. There may, however, be a poor link between definition and 
operationalization for any one scholar. This is often considered the most important threat to 
validity. Despite this, the validity and reliability of the operationalization of the independent 
variable is considered high.  
 
3.4 Control Variables  
 
There are five main control variables in this study, which cannot be explained by actions within 
the different health care financing models. This is important because operating with control 
variables that potentially correlate with the health care system would create a bias in the sample, 
since they could affect mortality through the health care model itself. By excluding control 
variables, such as cholesterol levels or high blood pressure, one would therefore avoid post-
treatment bias. The control variables used are age, alcohol consumption, GDP, tobacco use and 
regime type.13 These are all variables that the health care models do not directly influence 
through medical treatment, but they could all possibly affect cardiovascular mortality. This is 
discussed in the below.  
 
3.4.1 Age 
Despite the dependent variable being an age-standardized rate, the effect of age on 
cardiovascular mortality is so important that the regressions are run with a control of how large 
percent of the people in the population that are above age 65. The majority of people affected by 
cardiovascular diseases are somewhere in their 60s, and the risk increases with age (Wilson 2014). 
This is the case for both men and women (Jousilahti et al. 1999 p. 1165). This is mainly because 
veins become firmer as a person age, and it is therefore harder for blood to flow easily through 
them. Additionally, fatty deposits collect along the artery walls throughout life, and this would 
further slower the blood flow (Resnick 2014). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 The causal chain of gender and cardiovascular mortality is not clear. Sex is therefore not used as a control 
variable. This is mainly due to the similar levels of mortality in pre-menopausal women, and much of the assumed 
effect on sex would therefore be controlled for through the age-variable (Jani & Rajkumar 2006 p. 359). At the same 
time there is not a common understanding of estrogen levels impact on cardiovascular health (Jousilahti et al. 1999). 
More medical research must therefore be provided before sex is submitted as a control variable. As of for now, it 
would not be clear what effect the variable would explain, and it is therefore not included.  
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3.4.2 GDP 
Income level, operationalized by GDP per capita14 is also an important control factor One 
reason for this is that it is difficult to manage your health if you are worried about putting food 
on the table or paying your rent (Stulberg 2014). Access to money therefore determines your 
level of stress (Kadlec 2012), which is an important determinant of health. Lower socioeconomic 
status is also correlated with greater risk of health problems (Clay 2001). Since this thesis view 
health as a measure of mean mortality rates throughout the population, GDP would be the most 
accurate measure of wealth. GDP per capita is not expected to be affected by the choice of 
health care financing system.15 
 
3.4.3 Alcohol Consumption  
Operating with a control variable for alcohol consumption is problematic, due to the fact that 
moderate consumption has a protective effect in regards of cardiovascular diseases, while binge 
drinking is a major risk factor (Wilson 2014). Heavy drinkers, for instance, have an increased risk 
of cardiovascular death compared to moderate consumers. At the same time, moderate 
consumers have a lower mortality rate than abstainers (BMJ 1991). The variable used here 
measures liters of consumption, and does therefore not contain a control of consumption 
pattern. Additionally, there are several hypotheses about the positive benefits of wine 
consumption. This is, on the other hand, problematic to conclude on, since specific types of 
alcoholic drinks are associated with differences in patterns of drinking (BMJ 1996). In any case, 
alcohol consumption may be a relevant control variable and is therefore included in the 
regressions.  
 
3.4.4 Tobacco Use 
Tobacco use is one of the main risk factors for developing a CVD (Wilson 2014), and the 
control variable is therefore included in the regressions. The reason why smoking affects 
cardiovascular mortality, is due to the vascular calcification, modification of the lipid profile, 
thrombosis and inflammation that tobacco use causes (Hirooka et al. 2013 p. 119). It does not 
take very large doses of tobacco to increase the risk of, for instance, AMI. Tobacco use 
additionally increases the risk of sudden cardiac death, stroke and several other cardiovascular 
diseases (Bullen 2008 p. 883).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Measured in constant 2005 U.S. dollars.  
15 It can be argued that improving health raises GDP by raising workers productivity. At the same time, improving 
health may have negative economic effects by, for instance, demographic dynamics. GDP could therefore be an 
endogen factor of health care. See Acemogly, Rogoff & Woodford (2009) for further details.  
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3.4.5 Democracy 
Baum & Lake16 (2003) argue that democracy is an important determinant of public health. More 
democratic states tend to provide higher levels of public health, as measured by a variety of 
output indicators including infant mortality, life expectancy, and immunizations. Democratic 
governments take responsibility for the overall level of public health and regulate private 
providers to ensure that outcomes fall within politically acceptable limits. As the base of political 
participation expands, citizens often demand improved health care (Baum & Lake 2003 p. 336-
338). This is supported by Wigley & Akkoyunly-Wigley (2011 p. 649) who argue that democratic 
societies are healthier because elected representatives must satisfy a wider range of supporters. 
Health services must therefore reach a broader range of the population. 
 
The democracy variable is classified by Cheibub, Gandi & Vreeland (2010). The main 
characteristics of a democracy in this operationalization are that the executive selection is not 
directly elected, there is election of the legislature, and multiple parties are legally allowed. In 
regards of parties, there must also exist parties outside the regime front, and elections are 
contested. It is important to note that Czech Republic and Slovakia share the coding of 
Czechoslovakia from 1960-1992. Estonia is included from 1991, and the thesis has used the 
classification of U.S.S.R. between 1960-1990. Germany is coded from 1990 in the dataset, and 
the thesis has used the values of West Germany up until then. For Slovenia, the values of 
Yugoslavia are used between 1960-1990. The main control variables are listed in the table below: 
  
Table 3.2: Control Variables 
Variable Label Code Source Missing 
Age Population ages 65 and above, % 
of total population 
POP65 The World Bank 
(undated a).  
0 
GDP GDP per capita measured in 
constant 2005 US$ 
GDP The World Bank 
(undated b).  
236 
Alcohol 
consumption 
Alcohol consumption, measured in 
liters per capita aged 15 and above 
ALCL WHO (undated c).  216 
Tobacco use Percent of population aged 15 and 
above who are daily smokers 
POPSMOKE WHO (undated c).  1151 
Democracy Dummy variable if democratic 
according to definition given in the 
source 
Democracy Cheibub, Gandhi 
& Vreeland (2010).  
 
017 
 
Table 3.2: Overview of the control variables used in the regression models in Chapter 5, with variable name, label, 
code, source and number of missing values. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Baum & Lake (2003) builds on Lake and Baum (2001).  
17 The data from Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland does not have values for 2009-2011. I have therefore coded all 
OECD-countries as democracies in these three years, to reduce the amount of missing data. The only OECD-
country this might be problematic for is Turkey, but Turkey is not a part of the sample. There could also be issues 
regarding for instance Mexico and some of the eastern European countries, but given that they were granted status 
as democracies in 2008, I do not find it in contrast to the coding given by Cheibub, Gandhi & Vreeland.  
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The thesis therefore operates with these five control variables, which are not expected to be 
affected by the choice of health care system.  
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4 Research Design and Method  
 
“The content of “science” is primarily the methods and the rules, and not the subject matter, 
since we can use these methods to study virtually anything” 
(King, Keohane & Verba 1994 p. 9). 
 
This chapter presents the research design of the thesis, and the methods that are used to give an 
answer to the research question. This study combines cross-national statistical evidence with two 
illustrative case studies. The case studies regards Poland and Spain, which have both changed 
financing model under the period of study. They should therefore be able to provide more in-
debt information about the results from the regressions. Qualitative and quantitative research 
designs in the social sciences should arguably be viewed as complementary, instead of competing 
approaches when choosing a research design. Both approaches have individual strengths (King, 
Keohane & Verba 1994 p. 3), and the combination of methods is therefore considered a solid 
framework for answering to what extent the NHS, SHI and PHI affects mortality from 
cardiovascular diseases.  
 
First, the theory behind the statistical model will be explained. The chapter will then move on to 
discussing methodological issues, such as fixed effects and missing values. Finally, the theory 
behind case studies will be presented.  
 
4.1 Time-series cross-section 
 
4.1.1 OLS with PCSE  
This section gives an introduction to the theory behind OLS with PCSE, the main estimation 
technique used in Chapter 5. The method used in this thesis rests on Beck & Katz’ (1995) 
understanding of time-series cross-section (TSCS) data. The format of the TSCS data is 
characterized by a repeated number of observations on different cross section units, as the values 
of cardiovascular mortality on OECD countries between 1960-2011 are. The time period is 
considered to be relatively long, since it covers 51 years.  
 
The reason why the use of OLS is problematic in TSCS data is due to temporal and spatial 
properties in the error terms. The method presented in Beck & Katz takes account for this large 
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number of parameter errors that is present in TSCS, while keeping the parameter estimate from 
OLS. The interpretation of the results would therefore be as in OLS regressions. This is because 
the OLS standard errors are replaced by panel-corrected standard errors (Beck & Katz 1995 p. 
634). OLS with PCSE additionally allows for the estimation of coefficients in unbalances panels, 
as there is in this study, and takes the possibility of differences in the variance of the error terms 
(i.e. heteroskedasticity) for the different panels into account.  
 
4.1.2 Prais-Winsten  
The particular model used is called Prais-Winsten18, and can be found in Prais & Winsten (1954). 
Prais-Winsten is basically a transformation of the values, so that the OLS regression would be 
appropriate.  More technically, this procedure allows, in theory, the estimated rho-coefficients to 
be consistent with the assumption for parameter estimates across the countries. This would then 
again lead to a higher precision of the estimates, because the numbers of observation that could 
contain errors would be limited (Feng 2004 p. 274). Prais-Winsten estimators are therefore also 
referred to as Nonlinear Least Squares estimators (Ostrom 1990 p. 34).  
 
4.2 Methodological Issues 
 
Even though the overall research design of this thesis is solid, there are mainly four 
methodological issues, namely omitted variable bias, measurement error, missing values and 
fixed effects. This is elaborated in this section.  
 
4.2.1 Endogenity and Omitted Variable Bias 
There are no clear theoretical indications of the dependent variable of this thesis affecting the 
core independent variable. Hence, the direction of the causal chain should be fairly 
straightforward. The most plausible endogenity problem is if countries with high cardiovascular 
mortality rates, for instance, all change to the same financing model because it is believed to 
improve the mortality statistics. This hypothesis, however, have not been explored in the theory 
on health care models, at least to the authors knowledge, and more research must be provided 
before this possible problem of endogenity could be further elaborated. Endogenity problems 
would therefore be linked to factors correlating with the dependent variable that is not adjusted 
for in this thesis. Normally, endogenity is quite difficult to test for, and here the inferences are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 If the reader is familiar with the Cochrane-Orcutt Estiamtion, Prais Winsten additionally use the equation for the 
first time period (Wooldridge 2013 p. 846).  
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based on assumptions about what the plausible causal relationship underlying a potential 
correlation could be. This means that a correlation between health care system and CVD 
mortality should come from the former causing the latter, controlling for the variables entering 
the regression models. If there are endogenity issues to the relationship investigated in this 
thesis, the causal conclusions drawn could be invalid. 
 
Another similar issue is omitted variable bias, which is the possible existence of a variable that 
affects both the core independent variable (x) and the dependent variable (y). In regards of 
omitted variable bias, there are potentially a number of factors that could underlie such bias. For 
instance, stress is one factor that could impact both x and y. This can be illustrated by having a 
wider institutional model with weaker safety nets as an omitted variable that could affect both 
the choice of PHI as financing model, but also CVD mortality by potentially increasing stress 
levels in the society as a whole. The issue with such problems is that stress related topics is not 
necessarily linked to the health care financing models, but to country specific factors, such as 
labor market policies or equality between sexes in regards of work around the house, or pressure 
of providing for a family. The causal conclusions from this thesis are therefore not considered 
extremely threatened by endogenity or omitted variable bias, even though there would always be 
problematic to guarantee the non-existence of these problems.  
 
4.2.2 Measurement Error in the Variables 
The possibility of measurement error is always a challenge in quantitative research. In regards of 
the data collected from the OECD, The World Bank and WHO, one should assume that the 
countries have different routines for reporting the causes of death, or other measures such as 
tobacco use or alcohol use. This, however, is not possible to account for in this thesis, and there 
is good reason to suppose that the OECD, The World Bank and WHO presents reliable 
statistics.  
 
In the classifications of the health care systems measurement errors are present if a country is 
wrongly operationalized into a category. The two main areas of concern in this regard are the 
former communist countries, but also Switzerland. Switzerland is sometimes characterized as 
using the PHI model up until 1996 (Cheng 2010 p. 1442). The thesis has solved this potentially 
methodological problem of measurement error by running the regressions with alternative 
operationalization to test the robustness of the main model.  
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Additionally, as mentioned in Chapter 2, most countries operate with some degree of a hybrid 
model. Degrees of model use could have impact on the conclusion, for instance, if the private 
health care accounts for a large share of the SHI or NHS, more affluent people could opt out of 
the system, and receive possible higher quality treatment in a private facility. If this is a common 
tendency, it would lead to a lower overall mortality rate, which would show itself as a result of 
the main model, but would actually be due to the hybrid characteristics.  
 
A similar problem regards the previously explored issues of path dependency. If the countries, 
which change model during the period of study, systematically keep features from the old model 
within the new, one could experience serious issues with measurement error in regards of the 
existence of what would in practice resemble a hybrid model.  
 
Hybrid models are not taken account for in this thesis due to the scope of the project. 
Classifying the countries into different degrees of models would be a project in itself. The issue 
would neither be solved by controlling for a dummy of whether or not a hybrid model exists, 
since the degree of use would be essential for drawing conclusions. This could have implications 
for the validity, but since this thesis aims at explaining to what extent the main model used 
affects cardiovascular mortality, the issue with hybrid models is somewhat reduced.  
 
4.2.3 Missing Values and Interpolation  
Some of the variables used in the analysis contain missing values. This particularly applies to the 
variable of acute myocardial infarction, which starts in 1980. There are also issues with missing 
values on the control variables, especially the control for tobacco use. Descriptive statistics of all 
explanatory variables are presented in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for All Variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Diseases of the 
circulatory 
system 
1478 572.543 243.461 170.7 2325.8 
Ischaemic heart 
disease 
1478 234.601 134.002 9.2 756.8 
Acute 
Myocardial 
Infarction 
925 99.347 56.160 7.5 302.7 
Cerebrovascular 
disease 
1478 157.031 77.308 40.6 448.7 
Age 1716 11.982 3.539 3.307 23.668 
Alcohol 
consumption 
1602 10.462 3.916 1.5 26.04 
Tobacco use 565 29.805 9.381 13.1 61 
GDP 1480 22779.67 14046.57 1467.095 87716.73 
Democracy  1716 .823 .381 0 1 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables.  
 
Table 4.1 show that the tobacco use variable only have 565 observations. This might create 
lower significance levels for regressions where this variable is included. This is also a problem in 
the case of Germany, which lacks data prior to 1990 on the dependent variable, due to OECD 
not having available data prior to the unification of the country. Similar problems apply to some 
of the former communist countries, or other countries classified as non-democratic in the period 
of study.   
 
One method of solving the issue of missing values is by interpolation. This is to estimate the 
missing values by calculating the average of the values post- and prior in time to the gap. This is 
a problematic method, since it would assume that none of the missing values differ from the 
overall trend of the variable. It would also treat these estimates as true values, and one would not 
be able to know for sure if the results represent the real values. Using interpolation is therefore 
not a part of the main model, but will be controlled for afterwards to be able to make more solid 
conclusion about the models robustness.  
 
4.2.4 Fixed Effects  
As mentioned, using a fixed effects model is a way of controlling for country-specific factors that 
are non-observable or in other ways difficult to control for. These effects are constant in time. 
This could, for instance, apply to cultural differences in regards of eating habits, food quality or 
general daily routines. OLS with PCSE is an inappropriate model to use when such effects exist. 
Basically, when using a fixed effects (FE) model one suppose that every country have a fixed, 
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non-observable constant that is correlated with the other variables in the regression. Fixed 
effects operates with the following equation:  
 γ!" =   α+   γ! + ΣXβ+   ε!" 
 
where γi is a fixed country specific effect that affects cardiovascular mortality. One of the ways 
of solving this equation is by adding dummy-variables for all the countries in the sample, except 
for one country. The dummy d_i, should be equal to 1 for country i, and zero elsewhere. When 
testing for fixed effects in the data used in this study, one tests if all the coefficients of the 
dummy-variables equals 0, since that would mean that there is no individual differences. This can 
be done by an r-squared f-test.  
 
An r-squared f-test compares R2 for two models, where one has included the fixed effects, and 
the other has not, to figure out if they are significantly different from one another. This would 
mean that at least one of the fixed effects regressions equals zero. When creating dummies for all 
variables minus one, and then running the f-test, the f-value equals 72,85, which mean that there 
is almost certainly fixed effects present in this thesis. This should therefore be taken into 
account, so that the estimates on the effect of health care systems gets more precise.  
 
At the same time, by using a fixed effects model, one cannot use any independent variable that 
does not vary temporally as an explanatory variable (Beck & Katz 2001 p. 492). This is because 
FE cannot be calculated when the variable under research does not change over time, since the 
estimator would not be identified. This is, for instance, the case for the PHI model in this study, 
and there is also very little variation on the other health system dummies. Countries change their 
health system quite infrequently, and this makes it difficult to investigate changes over time while 
controlling for country-specific factors. Using a fixed effects model might also lead to many 
parameters to estimate, which would make it difficult to reveal any other possible effects.  
 
An alternative would be to use fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) models, which would 
take into account that health care systems are slow moving. Given the data used in this thesis, 
the OLS with PCSE would be just as good, since the FEVD model would create such a high 
number of estimates, which would make it hard to separate them from each other and draw a 
conclusion. This would therefore only create different methodological problems, and a FEVD 
model will not be used.  
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Fixed effects are therefore not used as the main model, but given the above-mentioned high f-
value a FE-model would be used as robustness test for the results.   
 
4.3 Case Studies  
 
This study performs, as mentioned, two case studies. These regard the change of health care 
model in Poland and Spain. Using a country as a case makes the external boundaries clear, and it 
is possible to draw conclusions of whether or not the model change affects the cardiovascular 
mortality rate (Gerring 2007 p. 19). The cases have been chosen to make an in-debt addition to 
the findings from the quantitative analysis. Both countries have, as mentioned, changed model 
during the period of research, which makes an effect on cardiovascular mortality, or lack thereof, 
much more illustrating than the regressions does. The advantages of including case studies are 
additionally that they often focus on information that might otherwise be ignored. The in-debt 
analysis goes beyond the ordinary descriptions, and highlights reasons behind the possible 
changes. The politics of health care finance is usually as complex as the structures which 
function within them. In this regard, the case studies can serve to remind researchers of the 
complexity of the political world (McNabb 2010 p. 105). This is found especially beneficial in 
order to achieve the necessary level of detail and depth to explore the relatively understudied 
topic of this study. 
 
There are some methodological issues concerning the conclusions one can draw from single 
cases. Rueschemeyer (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003) is skeptical of what he considers the 
most conventional view of single case studies, namely that the only theoretical outcome would 
be hypothesis generation that can be tested in more numerous cases. Even though one can draw 
conclusions of how the models affected cardiovascular mortality in Spain and Poland, there is no 
guarantee that these conclusions can be generalized. The external validity of a case is therefore 
not as high as its internal. On the other hand, one can argue that the cases are somewhat 
representative of neighboring countries, which underwent similar political changes in the time 
period of study. Operating with countries with similar backgrounds strengthens the external 
validity of the cases. The main reason behind the case studies is, however, the illustrative effect. 
Additionally, the political science literature on health care models is narrow, and the possibility 
of hypothesis generation would therefore be an added bonus to the thesis framework for further 
scholarly debate. 
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5 Results  
 
This chapter presents the results from the main OLS with PCSE model, as discussed in chapter 
3 and 4. The chapter will then move on to robustness testing of the model.  
 
5.1 OLS with PCSE 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, the main model of regression uses a Prais-Winsten transformation of 
the data. The coefficients presented in the following tables can therefore be interpreted in the 
same way as OLS regressions. The broadest measure of cardiovascular disease is, as mentioned, 
diseases of the circulatory system. This is therefore the first regression presented.  
 
Table 5.1: Model 1 - Mortality from Diseases of the Circulatory System as Dependent Variable 
 a 
b/t 
b 
b/t 
c 
b/t 
d 
b/t 
e 
b/t 
SHI -40.945 
(-1.62) 
-16.351 
(-0.87) 
36.771 
(0.99) 
-21.794 
(-1.23) 
-21.794 
(-1.23) 
PHI -85.512^ 
(-1.90)  
5.551 
(0.13) 
75.484*** 
(3.39) 
152.455*** 
(8.64) 
152.455*** 
(8.64) 
Age -28.837*** 
(-5.82) 
-27.973*** 
(-7.86) 
-6.471 
(-1.18) 
2.696 
(0.77) 
2.696 
(0.77) 
Alcohol  5.007* 
(2.43) 
13.995* 
(2.34) 
18.681*** 
(4.95) 
18.681*** 
(4.95) 
Tobacco Use   13.716*** 
(6.91) 
8.743*** 
(7.75) 
8.743*** 
(7.75) 
GDP    -0.008*** 
(-9.70) 
-0.008*** 
(-9.70) 
Democracy     221.139*** 
(3.73) 
Constant 1005.498*** 
(14.70) 
863.817*** 
(15.53) 
52.490 
(0.51) 
211.139*** 
(3.73) 
 
N 1478.000 1428.000 543.000 527.000 527.000 
Table 5.1: Regression of diseases of the circulatory system. Column 1 explains which control variable that is 
included in the different regressions. NHS is used as reference category.  
Significance level: ^=0.10, *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 
Table 5.1 illustrates the health care financing models impact on cardiovascular death, using 
diseases of the circulatory system as measure of cardiovascular disease. When all control 
variables are included (regression e), countries using the SHI experience approximately 22 fewer 
deaths per 100,000 people than the countries using the NHS. The SHI coefficient is, on the 
other hand, not significant at a 0.10 level. One does therefore not have strong enough evidence 
to keep the hypothesis about the SHI performing somewhat better than the NHS.  
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In regards of the PHI, on the other hand, table 5.1 shows that when all control variables are 
included, the PHI accounts for 152.455 more deaths from circulatory diseases per every 100,000, 
compared to the NHS. This coefficient is additionally significant on a 0.001 level. Based on the 
results from the regression, there is reason to believe that the NHS and SHI perform better than 
the PHI, and the hypothesis is therefore kept. 
 
It is also interesting to note that, despite the theoretical assumption about democracy leading to 
better health, having a democratic regime accounts for approximately 211 more deaths per 
100,000 than its non-democratic counterpart. This does, on the other hand, probably correlate 
with other factors that follows a transition to democracy, and not democracy per se.  
 
As mentioned, some authors categorize Switzerland as using the PHI until 1996. The model has 
therefore been run with this alternative operationalization to make sure that the main model is 
robust. When categorizing Switzerland as PHI on the diseases of the circulatory system variable 
the following coefficients are estimated:  
 
Table 5.2: Alternative Operationalization of Switzerland 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>IzI 95% conf intervall 
SHI1 -24.191 18.661 -1.30 0.195 -60.766 12.385 
PHI1 145.107 19.161 7.57 0.000 107.552 182.662 
Age 2.719 3.511 0.77 0.439 -4.163 9.601 
Alcohol 18.490 3.762 4.92 0.000 11.116 25.863 
Tobacco 
use 
8.650 1.124 7.70 0.000 6.447 10.853 
GDP -.008 .001 -10.01 0.000 -.010 -.007 
Democracy 221.258 55.263 4 0.000 112.945 329.570 
rhos 0 0 0 .601 0 0 
Table 5.2: Regression of diseases of the circulatory system with Switzerland categorized as PHI until 1996.  
 
As one can read from table 5.2, the coefficient for the PHI is reduced from 152.455 to 145.107 
deaths per 100,000. The coefficient is still significant at a 0,01 level. There is little change in the 
SHI coefficient. A similar trend is found when running the regression with ischaemic heart 
disease as dependent variable. All coefficients are almost unchanged when using the acute 
myocardial infarction and cerebrovascular disease as measure of cardiovascular disease. These 
regressions can be found in appendix 1.  There does therefore not seem to be any notable 
differences when using the alternative operationalization of Switzerland, and this problem is 
therefore not elaborated any further.  
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Diseases of the circulatory system are, as mentioned, a very wide definition of cardiovascular 
diseases. Three other operationalizations of cardiovascular diseases are therefore used.  
 
Table 5.3: Model 1 - Mortality from Ischaemic Heart Disease as Dependent Variable 
 a 
b/t 
b 
b/t 
c 
b/t 
d 
b/t 
e 
b/t 
SHI -16.736* 
(-2.29) 
-14.029* 
(-1.99) 
-2.642 
(-0.13) 
-18.388 
(-1.01) 
-18.388 
(-1.01) 
PHI 110-499*** 
(2.99) 
133.820*** 
(3.36) 
112.509*** 
(6.93) 
155.476*** 
(8.97) 
155.476*** 
(8.97) 
Age -7.845*** 
(-4.12) 
-9.378*** 
(-5.58) 
-3.634 
(-1.30) 
5.633^ 
(1.92) 
5.633^ 
(1.92) 
Alcohol  0.602 
(0.71) 
3.844 
(1.23) 
5.633^ 
(1.92) 
5.633^ 
(1.92) 
Tobacco use   6.827*** 
(7.23) 
5.034*** 
(5.46) 
5.034*** 
(5.46) 
GDP    -0.004*** 
(-5.75) 
-0.004*** 
(-5.75) 
Democracy     73.397* 
(2.10) 
Constant 317.630*** 
(13.00) 
309.099*** 
(13.45) 
29.218 
(0.62) 
73.397* 
(2.10) 
 
N 1478.000 1428.000 543.000 527.000 527.000 
Table 5.3: Regression of ischaemic heart disease. Column 1 explains which control variable that is included in the 
different regressions. NHS is used as reference category.  
Significance level: ^=0.10, *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 
The results for ischaemic heart disease, as presented in table 5.3 are very similar to the ones from 
the overall measure from diseases of the circulatory system. The coefficients for the SHI variable 
is only significant in regression a and b, but the overall trend is that the countries using the SHI 
experience fewer deaths than the countries using the NHS. The results are still not significant, so 
the findings are not clear enough to keep the hypothesis.  
 
In regards of the PHI the coefficient is significant at a 0.001 level, and by accounting for 155.476 
more deaths per 100,000 compared to the NHS, the hypothesis of the NHS and the SHI 
producing lower death rates from cardiovascular diseases than the PHI seem to be accurate in 
regards of ischaemic heart disease.  
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Table 5.4: Model 1 - Mortality from Acute Myocardial Infarction as Dependent Variable 
 a 
b/t 
b 
b/t 
c 
b/t 
d 
b/t 
e 
b/t 
SHI -9.708*** 
(-2.708) 
-12.448*** 
(-3.50) 
-44.424*** 
(-5.54) 
-45.178*** 
(-5.82) 
-45.178*** 
(-5.82) 
PHI 10.669 
(1.31) 
11.480 
(1.46) 
16.590** 
(2.99) 
17-507** 
(2.82) 
17.507** 
(2.82) 
Age -3.816*** 
(-6.31) 
-4.186*** 
(-6.71) 
-4.277*** 
(-3.86) 
-3.880*** 
(-3.32) 
-3.880*** 
(-3.32) 
Alcohol  1.353** 
(2.98) 
7.038*** 
(5.94) 
6.633*** 
(5.46) 
6.633*** 
(5.46) 
Tobacco use   2.358*** 
(3.76) 
2.372*** 
(3.76) 
2.372*** 
(3.76) 
GDP    -0.000 
(-0.85) 
-0.000 
(.) 
Democracy     34.591^ 
(1.74) 
Constant 144.179*** 
(17.37) 
136.807*** 
(19.86) 
30.491 
(1.45) 
34.591^ 
(1.74) 
 
N 925.000 910.000 421.000 407.000 407.000 
Table 5.4: Regression of acute myocardial infarction. Column 1 explains which control variable that is included in 
the different regressions. NHS is used as reference category.  
Significance level: ^=0.10, *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 
Table 5.4 presents the results when acute myocardial infarction is used as measure for 
cardiovascular diseases. The results for this regression differ from the two previous 
operationalizations of CVDs. Firstly, the coefficient for the SHI is significant at a 0,001 level. 
Based on this, on can therefore conclude that the SHI accounts for approximately 45 fewer acute 
myocardial infarction deaths per 100,000 compared to the NHS. There is therefore evidence to 
support the second hypothesis. 
 
Additionally, the PHI performs slightly better in regards of AMI, and accounts for approximately 
18 more deaths per 100,000 than the NHS does. This is still a higher death rate than the two 
other systems, and is therefore compatible with the findings from the two previous regressions.  
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Table 5.5: Model 1 - Mortality from Cerebrovascular Disease as Dependent Variable 
 a 
b/t 
b 
b/t 
c 
b/t 
d 
b/t 
e 
b/t 
SHI -5.946 
(-1.44) 
-3.443 
(-0.94) 
11.919 
(1.36) 
-12.995^ 
(-1.91) 
-12.995^ 
(-1.91) 
PHI -42.125*** 
(-4.83) 
-37.782*** 
(-3.74) 
-24.114*** 
(-3.97) 
-1.249 
(-0.24) 
-1.249 
(-0.24) 
Age -8.067*** 
(-6.76) 
-8.446*** 
(-8.84) 
-2.848* 
(-2.50) 
0.165 
(0.16) 
0.165 
(0.16) 
Alcohol  1.566** 
(3.05) 
4.136** 
(3.09) 
6.050*** 
(6.28) 
6-050*** 
(6.28) 
Tobacco use   4.057*** 
(6.79) 
2.308*** 
(4.49) 
2.308*** 
(4.49) 
GDP    -0.003*** 
(-7.82) 
-0.003*** 
(-7.82) 
Democracy     81.153*** 
(3.35) 
Constant 251.005*** 
(15.95) 
237.140*** 
(16.06) 
9.309 
(0.37) 
81.153*** 
(3.35) 
 
N 1478.000 1428.000 543.000 527.000 527.000 
Table 5.5: Regression of cerebrovascular disease. Column 1 explains which control variable that is included in the 
different regressions. NHS is used as reference category.  
Significance level: ^=0.10, *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 
The last regressions are run with cerebrovascular diseases as measure of cardiovascular diseases. 
This is also the operationalization that produces the most differing estimates of the four 
variables. In regards of the SHI, the coefficient is significant at a 0.10 level, and indicates that the 
SHI performs somewhat better than the NHS. The coefficient for the PHI, on the other hand, 
indicates that there is little separating the system from the NHS in regards of cerebrovascular 
death. The coefficient is not significant at a 0.10 level when all control variables are included, and 
one does therefore not have strong enough evidence to dismiss hypothesis one.  
 
The overall findings from the OLS with PCSE regressions supports the first hypothesis, and the 
NHS and SHI seems to produce lower mortality rates from cardiovascular diseases than the 
PHI. Cerebrovascular diseases stands out, but given the significance levels of the three first 
regressions, one can safely make this conclusion. In regards of the SHI, the results are more 
mixed, and it is only AMI and cerebrovascular disease that produce significant coefficients. The 
overall trend seems, on the other hand, to lean towards the SHI performing somewhat better 
than the NHS, and both hypothesis is therefore kept.  
 
It is though important to note how small the differences are. Even if the PHI accounts for 
approximately 155 more deaths than the NHS in regards to diseases of ischeamic heart disease, 
this is only an increase of 0.16%. This is the highest difference between the two systems. When it 
	  48	  
comes to the SHI, on the other hand, the largest significant coefficient is -45.178, and regards 
acute myocardial infarction. This is an improvement of approximately 0.05%, which is a rather 
small difference. On the other hand, in matters of life and death, every life saved is a victory, and 
the absolute numbers should therefore play an important role when concluding on performance 
between the systems. Additionally, it is important to note that these estimates would represent 
very different numbers of actual deaths in the OECD countries, given the differences in absolute 
mortality rates between the countries. This will be further discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
5.2 Communist Model  
 
As mentioned, categorizing Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia as 
using the NHS during the era of communism, is possibly problematic. The following regressions 
have therefore included the communist models as a fourth category of the independent variable.   
 
Table 5.6: Mortality from Diseases of the Circulatory System as Dependent Variable 
 a 
b/t 
b 
b/t 
c 
b/t 
d 
b/t 
e 
b/t 
SHI 44.003** 
(2.72) 
14.936 
(1.01) 
58.455* 
(2.04) 
-18.825 
(-1.04) 
-18.825 
(-1.04) 
PHI -16.473 
(-0.45) 
24.693 
(0.59) 
102.804*** 
(5.57) 
154.155*** 
(8.64) 
154.155*** 
(8.64) 
CHS 224.683*** 
(3.39) 
71.513 
(1.44) 
923.210*** 
(2.87) 
158.644** 
(2.81) 
158.644** 
(2.81) 
Age -23.301*** 
(-4.33) 
-25.968*** 
(-6.57) 
-4.977 
(-1.05) 
2.646 
(0.76) 
2.646 
(0.76) 
Alcohol   4.782* 
(2.33) 
15.088** 
(2.94) 
18.873*** 
(5.05) 
18.873*** 
(5.05) 
Tobacco use   13.715*** 
(7.63) 
8.764*** 
(7.72) 
8.764*** 
(7.72) 
GDP    -0.008*** 
(-10.37) 
-0.008*** 
(-10.37) 
Democracy     202.482*** 
(3.63) 
Constant 874.134*** 
(12.60) 
824.198*** 
(14.08) 
-2.129 
(-0.02) 
202.482*** 
(3.63) 
 
N 1478.000 1428.000 543.000 527.000 527.000 
Table 5.6: Regression of diseases of the circulatory system using for operationalization of the independent variable. 
Column 1 explains which control variable that is included in the different regressions. NHS is used as reference 
category.  
Significance level: ^=0.10, *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 
Table 5.6 shows that when operating with four kinds of health care financing systems, the 
coefficient for the SHI system is still not significant at a 0,10 level. When moving from NHS to 
PHI, the number of deaths per 100,000 has only changed by 2 values, and PHI answers to 154 
more deaths than the NHS. This is interesting since the CHS countries were operationalized as 
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NHS last regression, and now CHS coefficient shows that the system explains approximately 159 
more per every 100,000 deaths from diseases of the circulatory system. The coefficient is 
significant at a 0,01 level. Overall, the alternative operationalization of the independent variable 
does not give very different results.  
 
When using the alternative operationalization on the ischaemic heart disease variable, the 
coefficients for the SHI and PHI system are approximately identical. The communist model 
does, on the other hand, reduce the death rate by 145 deaths per 100,000. So far, this model is 
therefore very varying when it comes to cardiovascular diseases in the communist system, and 
much could probably have to do with routines for reporting deaths. The results for acute 
myocardial infarction and cerebrovascular disease do not vary much either, and the robustness of 
the first model is therefore considered to be good in regards of operationalization of the 
independent variable.  
 
5.3 Robustness Tests  
 
5.3.1 Mulitcolinearity  
 NHS SHI PHI Circulatory Age Alcohol Tobacco 
Use 
GDP 
NHS 1.000        
SHI -0.870 1.000       
PHI -0.325 -0.325 1.000      
Circulatory 0.077 -0.123 0.084 1.000     
Age 0.168 -0.089 -0.163 -0.339 1.000    
Alcohol -.223 0.240 -0.015 0.064 0.157 1.000   
Tobacco -0.056 0.115 -0.108 0.625 -0.351 -0.014 1.000  
GDP 0.114 -0.131 0.023 -0.536 0.0365 -0.088 -0.363 1.000 
Table 5.7: Correlation matrix for independent- and control variables in model 1. Democracy was omitted from the 
regression.  
 
One of the problems in the regressions is the lack of significant results for the SHI coefficients. 
One possible reason for this could be due to co-linearity. As presented in table 5.7, the co-
linearity between the NHS and the SHI is very high, and is a possible reason for lack of 
significant coefficients for the SHI.  
 
5.3.2 Missing Values 
Another possible solution to the problem of significance could be due to the high number of 
missing values. This is especially problematic when including the control variable for tobacco 
use, as mentioned in Chapter 3. In regards of diseases of the circulatory system, the variable only 
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accounted for 8 per every 100,000 deaths, and excluding it from the regression should therefore 
not be as problematic as the theoretical assumption suggests.  
 
The results for diseases of the circulatory system did not produce coefficients significant at a 
0.05 level for the SHI system. The regressions using mortality from cerebrovascular disease did 
produce significant results with tobacco use included, and excluding the variable did not affect 
the level of significance.  
 
Table 5.8: Model 1 - Mortality from Ischaemic Heart Disease without control for Tobacco Use 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95%Conf. Interval 
SHI -12.313 6.020 -2.05 0.041 -24.112 -.515 
PHI 140.478 39.704 3.54 0.000 62.659 218.296 
Age -5.372 1.804 -2.98 0.003 -8.907 -1.836 
Alcohol .969 .842 1.15 0.250 -.681 2.619 
GDP -.002 .001 -4.53 0.000 -.003 -.001 
Democracy 17.879 5.908 3.03 0.002 6.300 29.459 
Constant 288.427 21.526 13.40 0.000 246.246 330.628 
Rhos .946 .945 .863 .955 .941 .925 
Table 5.8: Regression for ischaemic heart disease with all control variables except for tobacco use, included. NHS is 
reference category.  
 
Table 5.8 presents the regression for ischaemic heart disease, without controlling for tobacco 
use. The SHI coefficient is now significant at a 0.05 level. Additionally, excluding tobacco use led 
to significant results at a 0.001 level for the SHI on the acute myocardial infarction variable.  
This supports the previous conclusions about the SHI performing somewhat better than the 
NHS.  
 
5.3.3 Interpolated Values  
Another way of controlling for missing values is by interpolating them. When interpolating all 
variables there were no significant results. This is with the exception of the PHI being signficiant 
on a 0,1 level when testing the mortality from diseases of the circulatory system variable. The 
lack of significance does also apply to model 2, where, as previously explained, the independent 
variable is operationalized in four categories. The regressions can be found in appendix 1. This is 
probably due to the lack of values for many variables between 1960 and 1980. This creates a lot 
of variation, which would be unexplainable noise for the PCSE model. The error term therefore 
increases, which would increase the p-values and lower the significance level.  
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On the other hand, the point of running a model with interpolated values in the first place was 
to obtain values on countries that could be systematically missing. There is a possibility that the 
interpolated results are true, and there is no way to conclude for sure that these coefficients are 
not the ‘true’ results. The presence of such results would indicate that the correlation between 
cardiovascular mortality and the health care financing models is not significant.  
 
What is most interesting is that the health care financing models coefficients, despite not being at 
a significant level, are close to zero in all regressions. This further indicates a lack of effect of the 
financing models on cardiovascular mortality.  
 
5.4 Fixed Effects 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, there are indications that suggest that there are country specific 
effects that cannot be controlled for. A fixed effects model is therefore conducted. As 
mentioned, this omits the PHI variable due to lack of variation.  
 
Table 5.9: Fixed Effects using Mortality from Diseases of the Circulatory System 
 a 
b/t 
b 
b/t 
c 
b/t 
d 
b/t 
e 
b/t 
SHI -94.747 
(-1.25) 
-53.725 
(-1.12) 
-231.643 
(-1.34) 
-52.060* 
(-2.69) 
-52.060* 
(-2.69) 
o.PHI 0.000 
(.) 
0.000 
(.) 
0.000 
(.) 
0.000 
(.) 
0.000 
(.) 
Age -64.729*** 
(-6.00) 
-62.687*** 
(-6.71) 
-25.666^ 
(-1.87) 
-15.963* 
(-2.25) 
 
-15.963* 
(-2.25) 
Alcohol  3.716 
(0.64) 
3.729 
(0.50) 
7.513* 
(2.21) 
7.513* 
(2.21) 
Tobacco use   13.785*** 
(6.16) 
7.750** 
(3.20) 
7.750** 
(3.20) 
GDP    -0.009** 
(-3.38) 
-0.009** 
(-3.38) 
o.Democracy     0.000 
(.) 
Constant 1413.180*** 
(9.16) 
1323.473*** 
(8.33) 
453.973 
(1.48) 
678.910*** 
(3.77) 
6.78.910*** 
(3.77) 
N 1478.000 1428.000 543.000 527.000 527.000 
Table 5.9: Fixed effects model of diseases of the circulatory system used as operationalization of the independent 
variable. Column 1 explains which control variable included in the different regressions. NHS is used as reference 
category.  
Significance level: ^=0.10, *=0.05, **=0.01, ***=0.001 
 
In regards of diseases of the circulatory system, the coefficient is now significant at a 0,01 level. 
The number of deaths reduced has additionally increased. Testing the data on a fixed effects 
model does therefore not change the main conclusion. It rather strengthens it.   
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When using the ischaemic heart disease or the cerebrovascular disease variable, the SHI 
coefficient is not significant at a 0.05 level, and the AMI variable does not differ remarkably 
from the main model either.  
 
5.5 Conclusion on Correlation  
 
The findings from the main model indicate that the NHS and SHI correlates with lower 
cardiovascular mortality than the PHI. The coefficients for the SHI however, are not significant 
in all regressions. As mentioned earlier, the AMI variable is of especially high importance when 
comparing the models. In this regression the coefficient for the SHI is significant on a 0,001 
level, and supports the hypothesis of the SHI performing somewhat better than the NHS. Based 
on the main model both hypotheses are therefore kept.  
 
When testing the robustness of the models however, the results differ. Firstly, the 
operationalization of the independent variable seems to be good, and using the communist 
model or the alternative operationalization of Switzerland does not make any major impact to 
the original findings. In attempts to heighten the level of significance, the exclusion of the 
variable for tobacco use supports the conclusion of keeping both hypotheses by creating 
significant coefficients for the SHI while the original interpretations can be kept. When 
interpolating the missing values, however, the results indicate that both hypotheses should be 
dismissed. On one hand, this is an important finding, and the overall conclusion should keep in 
mind the possibility of no correlation between financing model and mortality. At the same time, 
none of the results using interpolated values were significant, and the thesis will not dismiss the 
original findings based on generated values creating coefficients that are not on a significant 
level. Further, when controlling for fixed effects, the results supports the keeping of the second 
hypothesis.  
 
Based on this, both hypotheses are kept, and the rest of the discussions rest on the existence of a 
correlation between the dependent and independent variable. When comparing the findings in 
percent, however, the differences become almost non-existent. This will be further elaborated in 
Chapter 8.  
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6 The Case of Spain  
 
This chapter is going to illustrate the findings from Chapter 5, through the case of Spain. Spain 
changed from the Social Health Insurance model to the National Health Service model in 1986 
(Cabides & Guillén 2001 p. 1209). There are relatively few countries that have changed health 
care financing model, and Spain is therefore a natural choice when picking cases. Additionally, 
Spain does in some aspects represent the Southern European Countries. Spain, Portugal, Greece 
and Italy all changed from a SHI-model of health care finance to the NHS-model in the 1970s-
1980s. With exception for Italy19, the National Health Service was established in the years 
immediately following the transition from dictatorship to democracy. In Spain, this was possible 
exactly due to this process of democratization and the role of the parties on the left, in power for 
the first time (Toth 2010 p. 329). Additionally, Spain is therefore a good clear example of an 
ideological change in regime making an influence on the health care financing model.   
 
As Chapter 5 has shown, there are small differences in the mortality rates of cardiovascular 
disease between countries using the SHI and the NHS, but the SHI model perform slightly 
better. One should therefore not expect to find any major changes following the change of 
model. A change would, however, support the hypothesis of the SHI performing better than the 
NHS.  
 
This chapter will first present a short historical backdrop to ensure that the reader understand 
the political context the model change occurred in. The Chapter will then discuss different 
aspects of the two models that theoretically should affect cardiovascular mortality in Spain, and 
make comparisons between the two eras to see if they are supported by the empirical evidence. 
To make the analysis more straightforwardly to the reader, the mortality rates of Spain will be 
compared to those of France, a neighboring country, which kept the SHI system the entire 
period of research.  
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 In Italy, the change was not approved on the back of regime change, but the transition from SHI to NHS was 
made possible thanks to particular political and economic circumstances. See Toth 2010 p. 329, for further 
information.  
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6.1 Political History  
 
In the period of study, Spain has gone from a dictatorship to a democracy. In 1939, General 
Franco came to power after the Civil War. His regime lasted until his death in 1975. During his 
time in power, new policies produced high economic growth rates, and Spain rapidly became an 
industrialized country. After Franco’s death, the country got a new constitution, dating to 1978, 
and underwent a fundamental transformation of the state, political structure and legal 
framework. One of the changes was the change in health care financing model. Spain 
additionally joined the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1986 (Carr et al. undated), and 
this new political status promoted the introduction of expansionary measures in order to meet 
EEC recommendations and to tight the gap with the more developed European welfare states 
(Guillén 2002 p. 61).  
 
Theoretically, one should expect a positive effect on democracy on health, even though this is 
not clearly supported in the regressions. Given the ten year gap between regime change and 
change of health care financing model, one should be able to separate the effects from one 
another.  
 
6.1.1 Social Health Insurance in Spain  
The first laws on social health insurance in Spain can be dated back to the 1940s, and were 
adopted under Franco’s regime (Toth 2010 p. 328). The first attempt to develop the model took 
place in the 1930s and was at the time supported by all political parties, although under different 
ideological and political motivations. After the Civil War, the Francoist government recovered 
many of the earlier SHI proposals, and social security-related health care was run by the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Security from 1942 to 1977 (García-Armesto et al. 2010 p. 39).  
 
In the 1960s, the SHI-model developed an extensive publicly owned network of centers and 
services for general medical care, specialized outpatient care and inpatient care in Spain. The 
motion can be said to have reached its highest point with the establishment of an extensive 
modern public hospital network. The public sector has owned 70% of available hospital beds 
and employed 70-80% of hospital doctors since the middle of this decade, a feature that is still 
characteristic today, and explains why the vast majority of health care providers are publicly 
owned (García-Armesto et al. 2010 p. 40).  
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Some of the challenges in the SHI in Spain were the problem of health care networks being 
accountable to different departments. This led to poor coordination and inadequate 
organization. Additionally, primary care and preventive care were severely underdeveloped, ad 
there were also an extreme uneven geographical distribution of health care resources (García-
Armest et al. 2010 p. 41).  
 
After Franco’s death, the Spainsh Welfare state was radically transformed (Guillén 2001 p. 1209). 
One of the major changes was the political decentralization of the state structures (García-
Armesto et al. 2010 p. 9). Spain is now territorially organized in autonomous communities (ACs) 
(García-Armesto et al. 2010 p. 2). In regards of health care, this transformation was not complet 
until the end of 2002. Today, Spain operates with 17 regional ministries of health, which have 
the primary jurisdiction over the organization and delivery of health services within their 
territory. Health expenditure is thus mainly determined by the regional administrations (García-
Armesto et al. 2010 p. 37).  
 
Another distinctive change in Spain, but also in the other Southern European welfare states, was 
the adoption of universal access of health care after the change to democratic regimes (Toth 
2010 p. 325). The Spanish constitution was approved in 1978 (Toth 2010 p. 329), and established 
the right to health protection for all citizens (García-Armesto et. al. 2010 p. 41). Further, the new 
constitution recognizing the right of all citizens to a healthy environment together with necessary 
public health services. Achieving equity in the territorial distribution of health care resources, as 
well as in access to health care, did additionally become a new goal (García-Armesto et. al. 2010 
p. 41-42). Between 1976-1978 the transition process was led by the center-right Union of the 
Democratic Centre (UCD), and the coalition further governed between 1979-1982 (García-
Armesto et. al. 2010 p. 12).  
 
6.1.2 General Health Law of 1986 
The Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party won power in the elections of 1982, and the General 
Health Law was passed during their first term in office (Toth 2010 p. 329). The establishment of 
the NHS, however, had become a long-standing aspiration among many politicians (Guillén 
2002 p. 50). This is for instance illustrated by the mentioned implementation of universal 
coverage in the constitution from 1978. The most important change following the General 
Health Law was the uniting of all pre-existing health care networks into a single institution  
(Cabides & Guillén 2001 p. 1209).  
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The General Health Law gave all citizens free access to health care. The financing of the health 
care system became public, and was mainly financed through general taxation. The law also 
adopted the integration of different health service networks under the social health insurance 
structure (García-Armesto et al. 2010 p. 42). The overall concern of the law was to secure a more 
equitable distribution of health resources (Abel-Smith 1985 p. 14).  
 
Three publicly funded mutual funds were the exception to the structure described above. These 
are the Mutalidad General de Funcionarios Civiles del Estado (MUFACE), Mutalidad General 
Judicial (MUGEJU) and Instituto Social de las Fuerazas Armada (ISFAS). These funds serve 
exclusively ministerial employees, personnel active in the judicial system, and the armed forces, 
and occupy a unique quasi-public position. Civil servants are the only group authorized to opt 
out of the NHS, and may choose to seek private provision of health care. Their members – 
about 5% of the population – enjoy privileged treatment compared with other groups, being able 
to choose, at no additional cost, whether to be treated through the NHS or by private insurance 
companies. The majority of those covered opt for private care (Toth 2010 p. 331, García-
Armesto et al. 2010 p. 42). This basically means that the professions who historically were not 
obliged to insure themselves against the risk of sickness even before the 1986 reform kept the 
same treatment after the creation of NHS (Toth 2010 p. 331).  
 
When the Law was implemented, there were already high levels of coverage in Spain. This made 
the implementation process less controversial, and the Spanish reform did neither have to deal 
with powerful independent health funds. The positive economic cycle in the late 1980s also 
helped the implementation of the model, by allowing public expenditure growth (Guillén 2002 p. 
61). There was therefore, to a large extent, political consensus behind the model change.  
 
6.1.3 National Health Service in Spain  
As stated, when the NHS was implemented, certain sickness funds were not only kept alive, but 
they continued to operate according to the principles of the old social health insurance system. 
This was also the case in Greece and Portugal (Toth 2010 p. 332). This illustrates the concerns 
form Chapter 2, of keeping features from the old model within the new.  
 
At the same time, there were several changes to the health care system after the implementation 
of NHS. Patients got, for instance, the right to choose primary doctors and pediatricians within 
	   57	  
health care areas (Cabieds & Guillén 2001 p. 1211). Between 1996 and 2004, the centre-right 
People’s Party (PP) was the governing party in Spain. This had implications for how the 
government operationalized the NHS. For instance, the Conservative Party authorized that 
public hospitals should be converted into private enterprises. As in Britain under Thatcher, the 
reaction of the socialist opposition, the unions and users’ associations was so intense that the 
text of the decree was changed a day after its publication to assure the public ownership of 
public hospitals (Cabides & Guillén 2001 p. 1211). This means that after just 10 years of the 
implementation of the NHS, it had gained so much support that a political party could not 
change it.  
 
In Chapter 2, the paper showed that taxation is the main funding source of the NHS. Taxation, 
however, did not fully replace payroll taxes until 1999 (Lopez-Casasnovas, Costa-Font & Planas 
2005 p. 221). Further changes to the model is shown in figure 6.1: 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Time-line of NHS development in Spain  
 
The Cohsion and Quality Law of 2003, passed by the Conservative Government, states the need 
for strengthening geographical equality of health protection as well as quality of care (Lopez-
Casanovas, Costa-Font & Planas 2005 p. 222). This is therefore a considerable attempt to 
improve equity in the Spanish health care system.  
 
6.2 Differences Between the Systems 
 
This section is going to present some differences between the systems. Additionally, some of the 
topics are, as mentioned, illustrated by comparisons between Spain and France.  
 
6.2.1 Universality 
As discussed in Chapter 2, universality is one of the main features of the National Health Service 
that should positively affect the outcome of cardiovascular diseases, by making health care 
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services available for the entire population. This is, on the other hand, also a feature of the SHI, 
and the change from SHI to NHS should theoretically therefore not have major impact on 
cardiovascular mortality. In Spain under the SHI system, public coverage was already high, and 
96% of the population was covered in 1986 (Cabides & Guillén 2001 p. 1209). Today, the 
Spanish National Health Service still does not offer coverage for everyone, but 99.5% of the 
population is covered. Spain is therefore an exception in regards to NHS-systems, since all the 
other countries using NHS cover the entire population. The 0.5 percent that is excluded is, on 
the other hand, composed of high-income self-employed professionals (Toth 2010 p. 331). 
When 96% of the population already was covered, there is no obvious reason to believe that the 
increase of 3.5% would be a major reason why deaths from cardiovascular diseases have 
dropped.  
 
Another way of viewing universality is by the fact that in southern European countries, rights 
guaranteed on paper are not always honored in practice. Long waiting lists often limit access to 
services, which are formally guaranteed by right (Toth 2010 p. 338). In Spain, waiting lists vary 
between regions, but are a problem everywhere (Tanner 2008 p. 14). This would therefore 
restrict the access to care, but there are no findings that indicate that this is a trend linked to the 
change between the SHI and NHS.  
 
There should therefore not be any major differences between the two models in Spain.  
 
6.2.2 Mortality Rates  
 
 
Figure 6.2: Number of deaths per 100,000 from diseases of the circulatory system in Spain and France. The vertical 
line marks 1986 – year of health care financing model change in Spain.  
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As one can read from figure 6.2, the death rate has steadily decreased after the change to NHS in 
1986, but this decrease started long before the model change. There is neither any sudden 
change in death rates after the regime change. The lack of effect on regime change on diseases of 
the circulatory system overlaps with the lack of significance in the empirical results. It also 
follows France’ rate, who, as mentioned, have kept the SHI model the entire period. France does 
have a lower death rate than Spain, but this was the case before the change of system as well, and 
the countries are actually closing in together, just as in the early 1960s.  
 
 
Figure 6.3: Number of deaths per 100,000 from ischaemic heart disease in Spain and France. The vertical line 
marks 1986 – year of health care financing model change in Spain.  
 
In regards of ischaemic heart disease there is also a decrease in the mortality rate after the change 
of model. During the last almost 30 years, the drop has, on the other hand, been greater in 
France than in Spain, and the Spanish decrease seem to have been moving slower than the 
French. This supports the findings in Chapter 5, and SHI seems to be slightly better than NHS 
at treating iscaemic heart disease. This thesis does not offer an explanation for the sudden drop 
in the late 1960s since it is neither linked to regime change or the implementation of the NHS.  
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Figure 6.4: Number of deaths per 100,000 from acute myocardial infarction in Spain and France. The vertical  line 
marks 1986 – year of health care financing model change in Spain.  
 
In Chapter 5, AMI was the variable with highest significance on the SHI coefficients, and the 
difference between the models should therefore be most visible here. Additionally, due to the 
discussed acuteness of treatment, this is the measure were effects from a new model would have 
the fastest explanatory impact, since many of the in-system risk factors are slow moving. In the 
comparison between Spain and France, the second thesis therefore finds support. The countries 
were approximately at the same level prior to the change, but France has undergone a faster 
reduction in number of deaths than Spain has.  
 
Unfortunately, the AMI variable is missing until 1980. One can therefore not tell if the change of 
regime had any impact on the mortality rate.  
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Figure 6.5: Number of deaths per 100,000 from cerebrovascular diseases in Spain and France. The vertical line 
marks 1986 – year of health care financing model change in Spain. 
  
In regards of cerebrovascular diseases figure 6.5 does not show any sign of regime change after 
1986, and the countries have had similar and steady reductions in number of deaths. Spain does, 
on the other hand, seem to be closing in on France’ level in the later years. The result is not 
surprising given the small difference between the models found in the regressions.  
 
6.2.3 Equity  
There is little available research on the equity of the Spanish SHI system. What is worth noting, 
however, is that the redistributive effects of the NHS are not very clear. In 1987, a year after the 
implementation of NHS, people with similar health problems did not receive similar treatments, 
and there was a pro-rich bias. Ten years later, in 1997, the problems of equity were just as high, 
but the bias was now pro-poor. Evidence indicates that low-income individuals were more 
frequent users of health services from 1987 and onwards, while emergency services saw an 
increase in high-income users (Lopez-Casanovas, Costa-Font & Planas 2005 p. 229). 1987 was 
just after the model change. The numbers from this year should therefore be more influenced by 
the SHI model than the NHS. Given the change in bias, the overall equity level between the 
systems is therefore not changed. At the same time, the findings strongly indicate that the health 
care financing model does impact the utilization of health care resources, with NHS being pro-
poor and the SHI being pro-rich. Further studies should therefore research if this trend is 
prominent in other countries as well. If, on the other hand, the 1987 findings cannot be 
accounted to the SHI, the change in bias within the NHS model is still very interesting, since it 
undermines the effect of model change by showing a major change within the same systemic 
framework.  
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6.3 Summary  
 
The case of Spain does to some extent illustrate the findings from Chapter 5. The thesis does not 
find any major changes in cardiovascular mortality that can be accounted to the change of health 
care financing model. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the AMI variable does not have as slow-
moving effects as the other, and the difference in mortality development between France and 
Spain straight after 1986, therefore supports the hypothesis of the SHI performing better than 
the NHS to some extent. The change of model is, at the same time, not very prominent, and the 
overall picture shows a limited effect of model change. Apart from this the changes have mainly 
been in form of decentralization and organization of health care personnel, which is not features 
linked to the specific models. In the case of Spain the health care reform was therefore not 
strictly linked to the ideal models, even though the source of financing changed. Given that 
some of the old health care funds were not abolished, further supports that the models have 
major variation between countries, and further research should focus on the specific elements in 
each country, to see if these have more impact on cardiovascular mortality than the  ideal model 
as a whole.  
 
	   63	  
7 The Case of Poland  
 
The second illustrative case study regards Poland, which changed to the Social Health Insurance 
model in 1999. There are, as mentioned, few countries that have changed model in the period 
under research. As Spain represented Southern-European countries changing from SHI to NHS, 
Poland represents another set of countries that have gone from the communist model, were 
health care was part of the command economy, to the SHI (Wendt, Agartan & Kaminska 2013 
p. 88). The communist model is not a part of this thesis’ study per se. Still, given both the 
theoretical and empirical findings about the favorable performance of the SHI, Poland should 
expectedly illustrate very clear improvements due to the change of model.  Additionally, the gap 
between regime change in 1991 and the health care system change in 1999 makes it simpler to 
distinguish the two from one another. Poland is also the most populous country in Central and 
Eastern Europe, and is thus of relevance since an improvement in health care would affect very 
many people.  
 
This chapter will first give a historical backdrop, before explaining the changes both after the fall 
of communism and with the implementation of the SHI. The chapter will then move on to a 
comparison between the two decades.  
 
7.1 Political History  
 
7.1.1 Pre-Communist Era and Health Care Under Communism  
Prior to communism, Poland used the SHI model, and 7% of the population was covered in 
1939. The ministry of health was created in 1945 and health was then declared a public 
responsibility. After the Second World War, Poland was under communist rule. In this regard, 
Poland, however, differs from the other countries in the eastern bloc by resisting some aspect of 
the Soviet model, and private practice for instance was never formally abolished. It did, on the 
other hand, become much diminished during the era (European Observatory on Health Care 
Systems 1999 p. 4-5). Social expenditure was given low priority by the Communist Regime, and 
this led to low standard of buildings, widespread outmodedness of equipment and low moral by 
the medical personnel, which had very low wages (Millard 1995 p. 179). The system distributed 
resources without financial performance being taken into account, and the home regions of top 
leaders, for instance, had much higher standard of health care than less favored sectors 
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(McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 104). Corruption and bribery were also widespread (Millard 
1995 p. 180). Additionally, the entire system had little connection between resource allocation, 
demand for services and need for services (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 104). Patients’ 
rights were also seemingly unheard of, and patients were often kept uninformed of their own 
condition (Millard 1995 p. 180).  
 
7.1.2 The Transition Era 
After the fall of communism, Poland experienced rapid changes in Government, but the health 
care system remained predominately state funded throughout the 1990s. The role of the private 
sector, on the other hand, increased (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 104).  
 
The main argument for delaying a health care reform was due to the economic instability in the 
transition era, but reform was additionally difficult to implement due to the frequent changes in 
government (European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999 p. 7-11). In 1992-93 the 
Government was Solidarity dominated with Liberal participation. Solidarity, on one hand, 
favored privatization of the health care system, and the creation of several small independent 
insurance institutions. The Liberals, on the other hand, wanted regional health care institutions 
with limited privatization. Additionally, there were conflicts within Solidarity, and there was 
therefore no proposal before the fall of the Government in 1993 (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 
p. 106-107).  
 
When the Post-Communists and Peasant Government came to power in 1993, they adopted the 
Liberal proposal (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 107). Under the Democratic Left Alliance 
(SLD), however, the ministry was strongly influenced by the medical elite associated with 
teaching hospitals. This led to a proposal for revised administrative structure, so that the country 
would be organized into regions, which corresponded with medical academy locations (Kornai, 
Haggard & Kaufman 2001 p. 257). When the Solidarity/Liberal Government came to power 
again in 1997 they rejected the act passed by the SLD, and proposed a plan close to the one from 
1992/93. The final bill was, on the other hand, closer to the post-communist version. This was 
due to the Liberal minister of finance, Leszek Balcerowicz, concern of small independent 
insurance companies would have a high potential of creating debt, which would burden the state. 
Overall, the main characteristic of the transition era can be said to be that there seems to have 
been more concern about how to avoid the problems that were associated with the communist 
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health care system, and less thought to how the transformation should happen (McMenamin & 
Timonen 2002 p. 107-108).  
 
7.1.3 Social Health Insurance in Poland  
The establishment of 16 regional health insurance funds and a separate fund for uniformed 
public employees, such as the army and railroad workers, came into effect on January 1st 1999 
(European Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999 p. 7). Within this SHI system, 
participation is mandatory for everyone who pays income tax, but it is not conditional to pay 
contributions to receive health care. The people who are not paying income tax are paid for out 
of the state budget (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 108). The 1999 reform was designed to 
improve patients’ choice in services by introducing a competitive health care structure. This was 
mainly done by separating purchaser from providers through negotiated contracts (Pieprzyk 
2013 p. 31), which was financed by the independent health care funds (Wendt, Agartan & 
Kaminska 2013 p. 91). Both public and private hospitals, laboratories and clinics competed 
against each other for contracts with the funds. Patients are additionally free to choose between 
all providers contracted by their Health Fund when seeking medical care (McMenamin & 
Timonen 2002 p. 110).  
 
The health care funds did, on the other hand, become politicized very soon after their creation, 
since territorial governments appointed the members of the funds’ boards. They were therefore 
replaced by a single national fund in 2003. The Polish SHI system uses therefore a state-run 
instead of a corporatist-run model of management (Wendt, Agartan & Kaminska 2013 p. 91). 
This has lead to a monopoly on health insurance, and instead of employees choosing an insurer 
on the base of predicted health needs, there is no alternative to the national health insurance 
fund. This system encourages providers to limit or deny treatment because insurance funds pay a 
small sum to providers to cover a specific number of patients over the year (Filinson, 
Chmielewski & Niklas 2004 p. 388).  
 
The Polish SHI system had trouble from the start. There were delays in channeling money from 
the government to the health funds, and the government therefore had to give loans to the 
health funds to keep the system going. There was also a lot of confusion in the initial stages, and 
patients were unsure which hospitals and health centers they could visit and how their bills 
would be paid (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 110, 113). With the hunger strikes and 
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roadblocks by nurses in December 2000, the reform proved a public relations disaster for the 
government (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 114).  
 
The main issue with the implementation of the SHI was, however, that the governance 
structures found in western Europe was missing at the start of the transformation, and have not 
been created since (Wendt, Agartan & Kaminska 2013 p. 91). In other words, the old 
management structures were not prepared to meet the challenges of the SHI (Pieprzyk 2013 p. 
42). An efficient and equitable system cannot be created by putting in place a market-friendly 
environment when the necessities for effective operation of market forces are absent 
(McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 111).  
 
Another issue with the Polish health care system is informal payments. This was both an issue 
under communism, but also under the SHI. This limits the supposed gains in efficiency and 
equity that the SHI should bring (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 p. 103). For physicians, the 
receiving of informal payments have been estimated to be twice the value of their salaries 
(Nekoeimoghadam et al. 2013 p. 6). There does not seem to exist a strategy for fixing this issue, 
and the SHI cannot work as intended before this is established (McMenamin & Timonen 2002 
p. 116).  
 
It is therefore clear that the SHI model, as implemented in Poland, does not function as 
intended and there are still major problems even more than a decade after the implementation. 
This impacts mainly the quality and quantity of services provided, but the practice of informal 
payments would also challenge both equity and universal access. One can also conclude on that 
several features from the communist model is still an issue, which supports the previously 
discussed assumptions of path-dependency in regards of model change.  
 
7.2 Comparing the Models  
 
7.2.1 Universalism  
The communist model offered universal access to health services (European Observatory on 
Health Care Systems 1999 p. 16). The SHI, on the other hand, covers 98% of the population. 
The group without health insurance is nevertheless entitled to free health care at the point of 
delivery (Mossialos 2011 p. 55, 70). In the implementation phase of the SHI there were problems 
with limitation in access for those who had not paid their premium, but this problem has 
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gradually been regulated (Golinowska & Kozierkiewicz 2008 p. 19). The major challenge to 
universalism in Poland rather relate to very long waiting lists for planned services (Mossialos 
2011 p. 71). Overall, there is therefore little reason to believe that there have been major positive 
effects in health outcome based on changes in the universal aspect of health care, since the latter 
has, generally, not changed much.  
 
7.2.2 Mortality Rates 
Poland has lower life expectancy rates than Western Europe (European Observatory on Health 
Care Systems 1999 p. 2), and the improvement that was observed in life expectancy from 1993-
1999, prior to the health care reform, can mostly be explained by better diet (European 
Observatory on Health Care Systems 1999 p. 2). This was, in turn, a result of market 
transformation, which allowed for a higher consumption of vegetable oil (Mossialos 2011 p. 10). 
When subsidies for animal fats during the socialist era disappeared, consumption fell dramatically 
while the intakes of polyunsaturated fats, fruits, and vegetables all increased after the 
introduction of a market economy (BMJ 2012). Binge-drinking is also much more common in 
Eastern Europe compared to the rest of the sample, which suggests that alcohol has been an 
important factor in the high rates of cardiovascular death (Britton & McKee 2000 p. 330).  
 
All of the former communist countries have changed to the SHI model of health care finance. 
Ideally, one should have compared Poland to a former communist country, which had either 
kept the communist model, or changed to the NHS or PHI. Since such a country does not exist, 
Hungary will be used as comparison to illustrate if the countries experience a similar 
development causally following the change of model. Hungary and Poland are the two former 
communist countries with the least missing values on the dependent variable. Hungary changed 
to the SHI model in 1989.  
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Figure 7.1: Number of deaths per 100,000 from diseases of the circulatory system in Poland and Hungary. The 
black line marks 1999, which is the year the SHI was implemented in Poland. The blue line marks 1989, which is the 
year the SHI was implemented in Hungary.  
 
Figure 7.1 show the development of mortality from diseases of the circulatory system in Poland 
and Hungary. Prior to the fall of communism, Hungary’s death rate was somewhat higher and 
more stable than Poland’s, who saw an increase in deaths up until the late 1980s. What is 
interesting is that both countries experienced a decrease after the fall of communism. In 
Hungary this overlaps with the change of health care model, while the gap between regime 
change and health care system change in Poland makes it easier to spot that the implementation 
of SHI did not start the downward trend.20 Based on this it is therefore not clear that it was the 
implementation of SHI that accounts for the improved rate of cardiovascular mortality in 
Poland. This is not surprising, given the poor implementation discussed above. Identification by 
these overall numbers will additionally be difficult since the substantive effect is relatively small, 
as indicated in the regressions.  
 
In regards of ischaemic heart disease, the picture is a little different. This is illustrated in figure 
7.2.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This additionally supports the theoretical assumptions about the positive effect of democracy on health, despite 
the empirical results for the democracy variable in Chapter 5. The assumption of the negative impact on democracy 
being due to lifestyle changes that are negative for the circulatory system is therefore strengthened.  
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Figure 7.2: Number of deaths per 100,000 from ischaemic heart disease in Poland and Hungary. The black line 
marks the year 1999. The blue line marks 1989. 
 
Ischaemic heart disease has not seen a major decline in Poland and Hungary during the last 50 
years. Unfortunately the Polish transition period lacks data, but the increase is most likely due to 
a change in reporting routines. Looking back at the development for Spain and France in the 
previous chapter, there was a decrease in deaths from ischaemic heart disease since the late 
1980s. In numbers, the decrease is greater for Hungary than for both Spain and France, but for 
Poland there were 112,7 deaths per 100,000 in 1960, and 127,8 per 100,000 in 2011. This is an 
overall increase, and none of the changes seem to be due to either regime change or change of 
health care financing model. The health care systems in Hungary and Poland have therefore not 
been capable of treating other possible causes mortality from of ischaemic heart disease, and the 
extent of explanatory power given to the SHI in these two countries are therefore limited.  
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Figure 7.3: Number of deaths per 100,000 from acute myocardial infarction in Poland and Hungary. The black line 
marks the year 1999, the year the SHI was implemented in Poland. The blue line marks 1989, which is the year the 
SHI was implemented in Hungary. 
 
When viewing the mortality from acute myocardial infarction there seem to be more support for 
the hypothesis in Chapter 2. The lack of data for Poland in the transition period is very 
unfortunate, but the decrease seems to start after the change of model. What is interesting is that 
the decrease in Hungary does neither start immediately after the change of regime. This weakens 
a possible conclusion of the SHI being the causal reason behind the decrease in Poland, since 
Hungary’s model change is dated to 1989.  
 
Additionally, the mortality rate from cerebrovascular diseases does neither clarify the effect of 
health care financing model change in the two countries. It is, on the other hand, important to 
note that this is the variable with least significant estimates in the regressions in Chapter 5. It was 
also the estimates that differed the most from the overall findings.   
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Figure 7.4: Number of deaths per 100,000 from cerebrovascular disease in Poland and Hungary. The black line 
marks the year 1999. The blue line marks 1989, which is the year the SHI was implemented in Hungary. 
 
In the case of Poland, there has actually been a decrease in mortality from cerebrovascular 
disease after the implementation of the SHI. The increase between 1996 and 1999 are believed to 
be due to changes in reporting routines. When comparing Poland to Hungary, on the other 
hand, one can see that the decrease in Hungary started around 1980, and not after 1989. The 
number of deaths is additionally higher in Poland in 2011 than in 1960, which makes it difficult 
to make a conclusion about positive impact of the SHI.  
 
7.3 Summary 
 
Overall, there is no clear improvement in the cardiovascular mortality rate in Poland followed by 
the change to the SHI. Firstly, this is not unexpected due to the poor implementation of the 
model. Secondly, the increase in reported deaths after the model change indicates that the 
reliability of the statistic from the communist era is poor. Discussing the effect of model change 
is therefore problematic. It is essential to note that there have been a decrease from 1999 to 2011 
on all four variables, and a possible trend could maybe be discovered in ten or twenty years from 
now. Given the lack of data from the transition period it is, at the same time, difficult to separate 
regime change effects from model change effects. There is, however, a steady decrease on the 
acute myocardial infarction variable, which indicates that the SHI do have a positive influence on 
the mortality rate, by reducing it. Again, the lack of data for the transition period comprises the 
certainty of this conclusion.  
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8 Discussion  
 
So far this thesis has shown that the theory and first hypothesis in Chapter 2 is supported by the 
coefficients from the regressions in Chapter 5. In regards of the second hypothesis, however, the 
results are not as robust, but the overall trend is in favor of support. The first hypothesis stated 
that the NHS and SHI would perform better than the PHI, while the second hypothesis said that 
the SHI would perform somewhat better than the NHS. The case study about Spain does not 
reject any of the hypotheses, even though the effect of system change is hard to spot. The case 
of Poland does not find any clear improvements in mortality after the change to the SHI. As 
mentioned, due to the problems with implementation in Poland, one should not dismiss the 
findings from Chapter 5 based on this case. The introductory question, however, is to what 
extent the different health care systems affects cardiovascular mortality in OECD countries. This 
will be discussed in this chapter.  
 
8.1 Comparing Mortality Rates 
 
If the mortality statistic is translated to differences in percent instead of viewed as numbers per 
100,000, the extent to which the NHS, SHI and PHI explain cardiovascular mortality in OECD 
countries are very limited. The estimated effects do, as mentioned, constitute less than 1% of 
cardiovascular deaths in a typical OECD country, when moving from the NHS to the SHI or 
PHI. This is supported, to some extent at least, by the two case studies, where no major change, 
directly accounted to the change of model, can be found. Additionally, this is supported by a 
previous study conducted by the OECD aimed at explaining the decrease in mortality from 
ischaemic heart disease. The study found that the decline in tobacco use in OECD countries was 
the major factor behind the reduction since the 1980s (OECD 2011 p. 28). 
 
Statistical explanations are incomplete by themselves, however, since they ultimately have to rely 
on intuitions, or other types of evidence, about possible causal mechanisms (Elster 2007 p. 8). 
Theoretically, the models have different characteristics that should make the causal implication 
solid. Despite the causal chain between health care financing model and outcome, the reason 
why the percentage differences between the models is so limited, is probably due to another, 
stronger, causal chain – the one between human behavior and health. Even though it is argued 
that one of the features of the health care systems is their ability to treat many of the behavioral 
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risk factors linked to cardiovascular mortality, none of the systems would be able to outweigh 
the positive benefits of, for instance, a healthy diet. This does also go the other way around. If an 
extremely unhealthy individual has access to quality medical treatment, there is no reason for the 
medical treatment to outweigh the negative impact the person’s behavior have on health. Due to 
the amount of behavioral factors that affect cardiovascular mortality, the extent of explanatory 
power left to the source of financing must therefore, logically, not be very high. This is also 
supported by the limited explanatory power of the risk factors included in the regressions21. 
 
At the same time, the coefficients from the regressions should be viewed in light of the absolute 
numbers of deaths in the countries. For instance, according to the regression of diseases of the 
circulatory system in Chapter 5, the PHI accounted for 152.455 deaths per 100,000 compared to 
the NHS. This number was significant at a 0,01 level. In the U.S., however, 2,468,435 people 
died in 2010 (CDC 2014). When comparing this to Norway, for instance, a total of 41,442 
people died in 2010 (SSB undated). In Germany, this number was 858,768 in 2010 (BPB 2012). 
2010 is a random choice of year, but over the entire time period, there have been large difference 
is absolute numbers of deaths between the countries in the sample.  This shows, however, that 
the coefficients in Chapter 5 have very different implications for the different OECD members 
in regards of how many people these coefficients actually represents. There are variations 
between all systems, and the coefficients would represent very different amounts of death in 
different countries. A difference of less than 1% could therefore explain very many numbers of 
deaths in a populous country.  
 
Given this premise of the limited explanatory power outside of behavioral risk factors, and 
differences in absolute numbers of mortality in the different countries, the thesis will now 
discuss the extent of explanatory power through three different approaches. Firstly, there will be 
a discussion of the limits of life, before the chapter moves on to discussing the slow moving 
effects of health care systems. Finally, there will be a brief section about the importance of every 
extent of improvement in topics regarding life and death.  
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Democracy did, however, have significant negative impact on cardiovascular mortality. As mentioned, this 
explanation is probably due to lifestyle changes that democracy brings in regards of personal freedom. This thesis 
does not conclude on the democracy variable, but further research should focus on the causal chain between 
democracy and cardiovascular mortality.  
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8.2 The Limits of Life  
 
This thesis supposes that the health care systems ability to treat risk factors are part of the overall 
assumption of whether or not they are good at lowering cardiovascular mortality. Given the 
small differences between the systems, one should suppose that the systems face these risk 
factors in similar ways, giving similar outcomes. The low explanatory power of the models can 
therefore be viewed as a consequence of the limits of a life. One cannot prevent the occurrence 
of death, and this would have impact on the extent of explanatory power the models possibly 
could have.  
 
The average life expectancy in OECD-countries was approximately 80 years in 2011 (OECD 
undated). Compared to the average of approximately 68 years in 1960, this is a large 
improvement. The country with the highest life expectancy in 2011 was Switzerland with 82.8 
years of age. With such high life expectancy rates, measures aimed at lowering average mortality 
in OECD countries is very difficult. Health care is not the main reason behind this increase, but 
still important, as it is closely linked to quality and availability of education, food and other 
socioeconomic factors. These factors are difficult to separate from each other, and are often 
shown through the contribution to health (Hart 2010 p. 14). The limits of life approach 
therefore supports an argument of the explanatory power of the models being high, taken into 
consideration the already high life expectancy in the countries of study.  
 
8.3 Slow Moving Effects 
 
Another way of viewing the behavioral risk factors is by discussing to what extent one could 
expect immediate changes following a change of health care model; i.e., some of these factors 
through which the overall impact of health care system on CVD mortality is transmitted. The 
behavioral factors are established, but as mentioned in the debate about the relevance of 
controlling for country-fixed effects, there could be country specific factors that impact 
cardiovascular mortality. This is particularly important when considering the liberties individuals 
in OECD countries have.22  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 A study from last year (Sekikawa et al. 2013) suggests, for instance, that if white American men consumed as 
much fish as Japanese men, the mortality from coronary heart disease among white American men would be lower. 
If American men adopted the eating habits of Japanese men, coronary heart disease would thereby probably be 
reduced in time in the U.S.  
	   75	  
In regards of effects after model change it is, on the other hand, not the possible cultural 
differences that are the challenge. In Norway, for instance, there was implemented a law against 
smoking inside eateries to shield people from second hand smoking. When the law was 
implemented in 2004, 54% of the population supported it. In 2011, this number had risen to 
90% (Helsedirektoratet undated). This illustrates that it is possible to change cultural attitudes 
rather rapidly. It is the effect of the changes that move slow. In regards of health care models 
there are several cultural attitudes that could be affected. For instance, private hospitals would 
profit more if the patients were healthier when admitted to treatment. The PHI could therefore 
have initiatives to promote public health campaigns in order to save money on surgeries or other 
forms of comprehensive treatment. This could for instance be campaigns about diabetes23 
awareness, and propositions about how to control the disease with exercise and diet. This could 
then again lead to a cultural change in attitude towards diabetes as something one should try to 
fight, while the physical process for the patients towards recovery could last a long time. In 
weigh loss, for instance, it is not enough to exercise and live healthy, one must actually use more 
energy than consumed, leading to a negative daily intake, which a healthy diet and exercise 
routine would not necessarily do. At the same time, since the NHS is a public system, there 
might be strong initiatives for politicians to implement laws that would benefit public health, 
such as the smoking prohibition in Norway. The theories developed on this area are limited, but 
even if the models have the ability to change attitudes, the physical changes for the population 
would not happen overnight.  
 
The effect of change between models does therefore not have to present immediate 
improvements to be an improvement. In Poland there is nothing that suggests that the mortality 
should decrease immediately following the implementation of the SHI in 1999. There is not even 
a guarantee that every person with risk of developing cardiovascular disease visited a health care 
service that year. When studying health care systems one should therefore expect the effects of 
the models to use some time before the positive, or negative, impacts are noticeable.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 By diabetes the thesis referes to diabetes type 2.  
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Figure 8.1: Diseases of the circulatory system in six countries using the SHI in 2011.  
 
Figure 8.1 illustrates this by showing the development of diseases of the circulatory system in six 
countries classified as SHI in 2011. It is clear that the three former communist countries have 
distinctively higher mortality rates than the Western European countries do, but the gap seems 
to be somewhat closing. Since the systems are slow moving, it should be expected that this gap 
would take time to narrow. Additionally, the lack of government structures needed for 
implementation of the SHI, as illustrated in the case of Poland, should be stressed even further 
when viewing the Eastern European countries. Lacking structure would imply that the effects of 
a health care system would use an even longer time period to fully settle, and the effects would 
consequently be delayed in time.  
 
The slow moving effects of health care systems, on the other hand, can not be stressed to far, 
since it after all is over a decade since the change of model, and the cardiovascular mortality rate 
in Poland is similar to what it was in 1960.24  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This is as previously discussed, not the case for acute myocardial infarction, were Poland has seen an 
improvement in later years.  
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8.4 The Choice of Health Care Financing Model 
 
8.4.1 An Analogy to Traffic Accidents 
Before discussing the choice of health care financing model, the thesis will view the issue from 
another perspective.  
 
In 2010, 5.4 per 100,000 people in Spain died in a traffic accident. When applying the logic from 
the debate of to what extent the health care financing systems can affect cardiovascular 
mortality, 5.4 per 100,000 is not a very large share of deaths. Comparably, 214.9 people per every 
100,000 died from diseases of the circulatory system in Spain in 2010. However, in March this 
year Spain implemented a set of new traffic laws, which for instance increase the fines for drunk-
driving and all cyclists under 16 is obliged to wear protective helmets. Children are neither 
allowed to travel in the front seats of motor vehicles. The reason behind these changes is to 
reduce traffic deaths in Spain (Spanish News Today 2014).  
 
Changes in policy assumed to improve the mortality rate would be comparable for the two 
topics. The policies prior to the March implementation were changed due to theoretical 
assumptions about the new laws lowering the death rate, and create a better traffic system. 
Seeing such political will to change policy over a 5.4 per 100,000 death rate, would therefore tell 
us something about the importance of individual lives, and the political will to implement 
policies that should affect the mortality statistics positively.  
 
At the same time, it is also important to acknowledge that there is granted enormous resources 
on health care, and health is a political subject. The traffic analogy is therefore an illustration of 
the importance of every life saved, and not an undermining of the political resources used on 
health care.  
 
8.4.2 The Politics of Health Care Financing Models  
When every improvement in the mortality statistics is valued, the debate additionally touches 
upon the politics behind the models. Universalism, for instance, is based on the view of health 
care as a right. This is both because such a policy would view life as valuable in itself, but also, as 
argued in Chapter 2, because of the economic value of having a healthy population.  
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Universalism is perhaps the biggest causal impact the health care financing models have on 
cardiovascular mortality. This is the main reason why the SHI and NHS were expected to 
perform better than the PHI. In the U.S., one of the challenges of universalism is, as mentioned, 
linked to attitudes about social groups. Even though taking responsibility for personal choices 
are very important, this cannot overlap with the discussion of universality. Firstly, it would be 
difficult to determine what a personal choice with negative impact on cardiovascular mortality 
would be, and secondly, there would be problems related to the personal choices one make that 
have a positive impact on mortality. Could a patient have done more to keep her health? It is 
therefore central to stress the importance of universal health care, and this would have impact on 
how good a model is, despite the low extent of explanatory power it would have on 
cardiovascular mortality.  
 
When looking at the political fundamental of the models, it is clear that the meaning of every 
policy improvement assumed to save lives is of very high political importance. Since every life 
saved would be important, the extent of explanatory power of the health care financing systems 
should therefore be viewed as very high. The choice of health care financing model does 
therefore matter, even though the differences in deaths per 100,000 are low.  
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9 Conclusion  
 
This thesis has aimed at answering the question of to what extent the National Health Service 
model, the Social Health Insurance model and the Private Health Insurance model affect 
cardiovascular mortality in OECD countries. Further, based on the theories presented in 
Chapter 2, two hypotheses were created. These were that the NHS and SHI was expected to 
have lower cardiovascular mortality rates than the PHI, and the SHI was additionally expected to 
perform somewhat better than the NHS. By running OLS with PCSE regressions, and 
illustrating the findings through two case studies, the answer provided is solid. 
 
From the regressions in Chapter 5 it is clear that when moving from the NHS to the SHI or 
PHI, the change in cardiovascular mortality is less than 1%. In absolute numbers, however, this 
would account for very different amounts of lives in the different countries. The correlation 
shows that the PHI accounts for a higher mortality rate than the NHS and SHI, and the first 
hypothesis is therefore true. These results were significant at a 0,001 level. In regards of the 
second hypothesis, the robustness is not as strong, but the overall trend is that the SHI seem to 
perform somewhat better than the SHI. Even though the correlation is present, and supported 
by the theoretical assumptions, the main conclusion is therefore that the models affect 
cardiovascular mortality in OECD countries to a low extent.  
 
The discussion in Chapter 8, however, showed that the overall conclusion must be somewhat 
modified. This is primarily based on the high average life expectancy in the OECD countries, 
which indicates that there is a limit on how much the models can affect mortality, since it is not 
possible to postpone death forever. It is also argued that a change of financing model should not 
be expected to give immediate effects, due to the slow moving effects of health care systems. 
The high extent of behavioral impact on developing CVDs additionally limits the models room 
of maneuver. Lastly, the discussion that politically, it is important to implement policies that 
These are all ways of creating a premise about the health care systems having limited ways of 
controlling cardiovascular mortality, which implies that the differences that exist between the 
models should be emphasized.  
 
It seems clear from the discussion in the thesis that for the PHI model, the lack of universal 
coverage is a crucial policy adaption, which would improve the cardiovascular mortality in the 
model as a whole. The NHS struggles with financial burdens linked to the limits of 
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can raise taxes, while the SHI mainly struggle with the separation between health care funds and 
providers of services, which should lead to higher competition, does not operate as planned in all 
countries. Additionally the NHS and SHI model share the problem with waiting lists for services. 
Given the low overall explanatory power of the models, further policy implementations should 
therefore aim to improve the weaknesses within the distinct models.   
 
The thesis does not, however, fully touch upon how good the models are. With an implication of 
every life saved being valuable, one should develop a throughout framework of how the 
different models could be improved. Small differences are important when developing actual 
health care policies, and this research is therefore very useful. At the same time, this thesis shows 
that given the high life expectancy estimates, viewing average numbers is probably not the most 
useful way of studying the effects of health care financing models on cardiovascular mortality. 
Future studies should therefore concentrate on certain socioeconomic groups to see if the 
different models include bias towards, for instance, the rich or the poor. The finding on equity in 
the case of Spain also supports this.  
 
As mentioned introductory, this thesis does not say anything about how much resources it takes 
to change model. One could therefore not conclude that the systems that accounts for the 
lowest mortality statistics in this sample should be used in all countries. Additionally, as seen in 
Poland, the implementation of a system in itself is not enough. There could be problems in the 
implementation process that would lead to the model to not operating at its full effect. The 
findings are still important for further discussion, and a broader framework should be developed, 
given the increases in public funding of health care across all borders. The source of funding 
does not matter to a very high extent. It is rather the choice of funding that seems to matter, 
given the ideological difference between the models and the impacts this have on what treatment 
a country’s citizens can receive.  
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Appendix 1: Regressions  
 
Dataset and do.-file can be obtained on request per email: tmwhaugen@gmail.com  
 
1 Model 1: Mortality from Diseases of the Circulatory System Switzerland categorized as PHI until 1996 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% conf intervall 
SHI -24.191 18.661 -1.30 0.195 -60.766 12.385 
PHI 145.107 19.161 7.57 0.000 107.552 182.662 
Age 2.719 3.511 0.77 0.439 -4.163 9.601 
Alcohol 18.490 3.762 4.92 0.000 11.116 25.863 
Tobacco use 8.650 1.124 7.70 0.000 6.447 10.853 
GDP -.008 .001 -10.01 0.000 -.010 -.007 
Democracy 221.258 55.263 4 0.000 112.945 329.570 
rhos = 0 0 0 .601 0 0 
 
 
 
2 Model 1: Mortality from Ischaemic heart disease Switzerland categorized as PHI until 1996 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% conf intervall 
SHI -19.503 19.373 -1.01 0.314 -57.473 18.467 
PHI 144.832 18.406 7.87 0.000 108.757 180.907 
Age 1.393 2,548 0.55 0.585 -3.602 6.388 
Alcohol 5.415 2.939 1.84 0.065 -.345 11.175 
Tobacco use 4.995 .942 5.30 0.000 3.149 6.842 
GDP -.004 .001 -5.73 0.000 -.005 -.003 
Democracy 81.744 33.520 2.44 0.015 16.045 147.442 
rhos = 0 0 0 .840 0 0 
 
 
3 Model 1: Mortality from Acute myocardial infarction Switzerland categorized as PHI until 1996 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% conf intervall 
SHI -45.178 7.761 -5.82 0.000 -60.389 -29.968 
PHI 17.507 6.203 2.82 0.005 5.350 29.665 
Age -3.880 1.167 -3.32 0.001 -6.168 -1.583 
Alcohol 6.633 1.214 5.46 0.000 4.253 9.013 
Tobacco use 2.372 .631 3.76 0.000 1.135 3.609 
GDP -.002 .000 -0.85 0.396 -.001 .000 
Democracy 34.591 19.873 1.74 0.082 -4.360 73.541 
rhos = 0 0 0 .257 0 0 
 
 
4 Model 1: Mortality from Cerebrovascular disease Switzerland categorized as PHI until 1996 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| 95% conf intervall 
SHI -13.550 6.825 -1.99 0.047 -26.926 -.173 
PHI -.146 5.343 -0.03 0.978 -10.617 10.326 
Age .199 1.012 0.20 0.844 -1.784 2.182 
Alcohol 6.074 .954 6.37 0.000 4.204 7.944 
Tobacco use 2.292 .514 4.46 0.000 1.284 3.299 
GDP -.003 .000 -7.79 0.000 -.004 -.002 
Democracy 81.678 24.093 3.39 0.001 34.357 128.899 
rhos = 0 0 0 .481 0 0 
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5 Model 1: Mortality from Diseases of the Circulatory system Interpolated Values 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
SHI -3.803 
(-1.26) 
-0.895 
(-.98) 
-0.352 
(-0.49) 
-0.732 
(-1.46) 
-0.809 
(-1.58) 
PHI -1.887 
(-1.28) 
-0.444 
(-0.98) 
-0.175 
(-0.49) 
-0.362 
(-1.46) 
-0.648^ 
(-1.90) 
Age -71.062*** 
(-14.15) 
-72.643*** 
(-31.22) 
-82.137*** 
(-17.68) 
-62.020*** 
(-6.05) 
-62.121*** 
(-6.07) 
Alcohol  25.150*** 
(5.90) 
28.731*** 
(7.19) 
31.360*** 
(8.99) 
31.430*** 
(9.01) 
Tobacco use   -2.121* 
(-2.26) 
-2.877** 
(-3.05) 
-2.875** 
(-3.05) 
GDP    -0.007* 
(-2.25) 
-0.007* 
(-2.25) 
Democracy     1.367 
(1.39) 
Constant 1432.557*** 
(23.38) 
1192.620*** 
(21.83) 
1341.795*** 
(16.24) 
1247.947*** 
(13.83) 
1247.228*** 
(13.83) 
N 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000  
 
 
6 Model 1: Mortality from Ischaemic heart disease Interpolated Values 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
SHI 1.054 
(1.23) 
1.254^ 
(1.65) 
1.302^ 
(1.78) 
0.774 
(1.49) 
0.731 
(1.40) 
PHI 0.525 
(1.23) 
0.625^ 
(1.65) 
0.649^ 
(1.77) 
0.385 
(1.48) 
0.214 
(0.69) 
Age -33.085*** 
(-20.51) 
-33.065*** 
(-20.58) 
-34.447*** 
(-13.43) 
-20.189** 
(-3.15) 
-20.242** 
(-3.16) 
Alcohol  1.423 
(0.50) 
2.011 
(0.69) 
3.029 
(1.20) 
3.066 
(1.21) 
Tobacco use   -0.314 
(-0.67) 
-0.484 
(-1.05) 
-0.483 
(-1.04) 
GDP    -0.004* 
(-2.38) 
-0.004* 
(-2.38) 
Democracy     0.835 
(0.98) 
Constant 635.669*** 
(32.34) 
620.658*** 
(17.49) 
641.857*** 
(13.81) 
562.823*** 
(10.27) 
562.344*** 
(10.26) 
N 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 
 
7 Model 1: Mortality from Acute Myocardial Infarction Interpolated Values 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
SHI 0.238 
(0.89) 
0.276 
(1.08) 
0.142 
(0.79) 
0.028 
(0.24) 
0.024 
(0.21) 
PHI 0.114 
(0.90) 
0.132 
(1.09) 
0.068 
(0.79) 
0.013 
(0.24) 
-0.038 
(-0.63) 
Age -26.454*** 
(-19.99) 
-23.765*** 
(-11.36) 
-16.652*** 
(-3.85) 
-8.469* 
(-2.14) 
-8.503* 
(-2.15) 
Alcohol   5.149 
(1.61) 
2.632 
(0.83) 
4.947^ 
(1.92) 
4.998^ 
(1.94) 
Tobacco Use   2.018^ 
(1.78) 
0.797 
(0.78) 
0.795 
(0.78) 
GDP     -0.004*** 
(-3.95) 
Democracy     0.505 
(1.04) 
Constant 450.454*** 
(25.73) 
361.657*** 
(6.28) 
236.883** 
(2.77) 
238.611*** 
(3.47) 
238.006*** 
(3.46) 
N 1089.000 1089.000 1089.000 1089.000 1089.000 
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8 Model 1: Mortality from Cerebrovascular disease Interpolated Values 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
SHI -0.627 
(-0.72) 
0.229 
(0.53) 
0.354 
(1.20) 
0.160 
(0.82) 
0.148 
(0.75) 
PHI -0.312 
(-0.73) 
0.114 
(0.53) 
0.176 
(1.20) 
0.079 
(0.82) 
0.036 
(0.30) 
Age -23.446*** 
(-16.37) 
-24.301*** 
(-27.73) 
-25.379*** 
(-20.02) 
-14.846*** 
(-5.04) 
-14.858*** 
(-5.05) 
Alcohol  6.659*** 
(4.39) 
7.421*** 
(5.60) 
8.487*** 
(7.80) 
8.506*** 
(7.81) 
Tobacco use   -0.212 
(-0.88) 
-0.322 
(-1.40) 
-0.322 
(-1.40) 
GDP    -0.003*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.76) 
Democracy     0.205 
(0.60) 
Constant 440.489*** 
(25.13) 
382.563*** 
(20.11) 
394.864*** 
(17.26) 
331.467*** 
(13.15) 
331.342*** 
(13.15) 
N 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 
 
9 Model 2: Mortality from Diseases of the Circulatory System Interpolated Values 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
SHI -0.882 
(-0.34) 
-0.574 
(-0.71) 
-0.187 
(-0.29) 
-0.630 
(-1.40) 
-0.222 
(-0.51) 
PHI 0.853 
(0.61) 
-0.131 
(-0.32) 
-0.013 
(-0.04) 
-0.261 
(-1.12) 
-0.295 
(-1.22) 
CHS 9.851* 
(2.10) 
1.297 
(0.97) 
0.675 
(0.63) 
0.427 
(0.54) 
2.840^ 
(1.78) 
Age -70.692*** -72.597*** 
(-31.19) 
-72.597*** 
(-31.19) 
-62.001*** 
(-6.05) 
-62.109*** 
(-6.07) 
Alcohol  25.125*** 
(5.89) 
25.125*** 
(5.89) 
31.351*** 
(8.99) 
31.423*** 
(9.02) 
Tobacco use    -2.876*** 
(-3.05) 
-2.869** 
(-3.04) 
GDP    -0.007* 
(-2.25) 
-0.007* 
(-2.25) 
Democracy     2.908^ 
(1.78) 
Constant 1425.352*** 
(23.19) 
1192.010*** 
(21.82) 
1192.010*** 
(21.82) 
1247.713*** 
(13.83) 
1244.819*** 
(13.81) 
N 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 
 
10 Model 2: Mortality from Ischaemic Heart Disease Interpolated Values 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
SHI 1.029 
(1.45) 
1.138^ 
(1.69) 
1.160^ 
(1.80) 
0.617 
(1.36) 
0.738 
(1.58) 
PHI 0.502 
(1.39) 
0.517 
(1.45) 
0.525 
(1.52) 
0.236 
(1.00) 
0.219 
(0.92) 
CHS -0.091 
(-0.07) 
-0.426 
(-0.35) 
-0.490 
(-0.42) 
-0.606 
(-0.73) 
0.032 
(0.02) 
Age -33.088*** 
(-20.51) 
-33.080*** 
(-20.58) 
-34.465*** 
(-13.43) 
-20.210** 
(-3.16) 
-20.242** 
(-3.16) 
Alcohol  1.429 
(0.51) 
2.019 
(0.69) 
3.041 
(1.20) 
3.066 
(1.21) 
Tobacco use   -0.314 
(-0.68) 
-0.484 
(-1.05) 
-0.483 
(-1.04) 
GDP    -0.004* 
(-2.38) 
-0,004* 
(-2.38) 
Democracy     0.849 
(0.68) 
Constant 635.734*** 
(32.34) 
620.879*** 
(17.49) 
642.118*** 
(13.81) 
563.126*** 
(10.28) 
562.321*** 
(10.26) 
N 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 
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 11 Model 2: Mortality from Acute Myocardial Infarction Interpolated Values 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
SHI 0.315^ 
(1.71) 
0.215 
(1.33) 
0.115 
(1.05) 
0.017 
(0.25) 
0.081 
(0.79) 
PHI 0.186^ 
(1.95) 
0.072 
(1.27) 
0.041 
(1.11) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
CHS 0.459 
(0.51) 
-0.411 
(-0.58) 
-0.180 
(-0.33) 
-0.074 
(-0.20) 
0.399 
(0.62) 
Age -26.431*** 
(19.97) 
-23.779*** 
(-11.37) 
-16.660*** 
(-3.86) 
-8.473* 
(-2.14) 
-8.495* 
(-2.15) 
Alcohol  5.165 
(1.62) 
2.640 
(0.84) 
4.951^ 
(1.92) 
5.001^ 
(1.94) 
Tobacco use   2.017^ 
(1.77) 
0.796 
(0.78) 
0.797 
(0.78) 
GDP    -0.004*** 
(-3.95) 
-0.004*** 
(3.95) 
Democracy     0.726 
(1.99) 
Constant 450.082*** 
(25.70) 
361.729*** 
(6.30) 
236.965** 
(2.77) 
238.649*** 
(3.47) 
237.504*** 
(3.46) 
N 1089.000 1089.000 1089.000 1089.000 1089.000 
 
12 Model 2: Mortality from Cerebrovascular Disease Interpolated Values 
 b/t b/t b/t b/t b/t 
SHI 0.078 
(0.10) 
0.322 
(0.85) 
0.343 
(1.31) 
0.103 
(0.60) 
0.125 
(0.72) 
PHI 0.305 
(0.68) 
0.199 
(0.98) 
0.165 
(1.21) 
0.024 
(0.28) 
0.022 
(0.24) 
CHS 2.182 
(1.55) 
0.335 
(0.49) 
-0.044 
(-0.10) 
-0.224 
(-0.72) 
-0.105 
(0.19) 
Age -23.370*** 
(-16.30) 
-24.290*** 
(-27.72) 
-25.380*** 
(-20.02) 
-14.853*** 
(-5.04) 
-14.858*** 
(-5.05) 
Alcohol  6.656*** 
(4.39) 
7.422*** 
(5.60) 
8.502*** 
(7.81) 
8.506*** 
(7.81) 
Tobacco use   -0.212 
(-0.88) 
-0.323 
(-1.40) 
-0.322 
(1.40) 
GDP    -0.003*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.003*** 
(-3.76) 
Democracy     0.151 
(0.29) 
Constant 438.936*** 
(24.96) 
382.378*** 
(20.12) 
394.876*** 
(17.26) 
331.571*** 
(13.15) 
331.424*** 
(13.15)  
N 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 1716.000 
 
13 Model 1: Mortality from Diseases of the circulatory system without control for age 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SHI -18.657 17.791 -1.05 0.294 -53.526 16.212 
PHI 157.299 16.461 9.56 0.000 125.037 189.562 
Alcohol 20.758 3.417 6.07 0.000 14.060 27.455 
Tobacco 
use 
8.409 1.137 7.40 0.000 6.181 10.637 
GDP -.009 .001 -9.86 0.000 -.010 -.007 
Democracy 236.981 52.387 4.52 0.000 134.305 339.657 
rhos =  0 0 0 .645 0 … 0 
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14 Model 1: Mortality from Ischaemic heart disease without control for age 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SHI -18.307 18.152 -1.01 0.313 -53.884 17.270 
PHI 152.272 15.930 9.56 0.000 121.049 183.495 
Alcohol 6.043 2.771 2.18 0.029 .612 11.474 
Tobacco 
use 
4.950 .935 5.29 0.000 3.117 6.784 
GDP -.004 .001 -5.72 0.000 -.005 -.002 
Democracy 87.534 28.824 3.04 0.002 31.039 144.028 
rhos =  0 0 0 .842 0 … 0 
 
15 Model 1: Mortality from Acute Myocardial Infarction without control for age 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SHI -45.072 8.265 -5.45 0.000 -61.271 -28.873 
PHI 23.732 6.561 3.62 0.000 10.872 36.592 
Alcohol 5.132 1.125 4.56 0.000 2.927 7.337 
Tobacco 
use 
2.447 .695 3.52 0.000 1.085 3.810 
GDP -.000 .000 -1.96 0.050 -.001 -3.18 
Democracy 1.835 19.402 0.09 0.924 -36.193 39-862 
rhos =  0 0 0 -.210 0 … 0 
 
16 Model 1: Mortality from Cerebrovascular disease without control for age 
 Coef. Std. Err. z P > |z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
SHI -12.920 6.727 -1.92 0.055 -26.104 .265 
PHI -2.272 4.315 -0.53 0.598 -10.729 6.185 
Alcohol 5.855 .969 6.04 0.000 3.956 7.754 
Tobacco 
use 
2.296 .519 4.43 0.000 1.280 3.313 
GDP -.003 .000 -8.75 0.000 -.004 -.002 
Democracy 83.404 24.210 3.45 0.002 35.954 130.954 
rhos =  0 0 0 .446 0 … 0 
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Appendix 2: ICD Revisions and Codes  
17 Overview of Revisions of ICD Used 
Country ICD-7 ICD-8 ICD-9 ICD-10 
Australia 1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-1997 1998-2004, 2006-
2011 Austria 1960-1968 1969-1979 1980-2001 2002-2011 
Belgium 1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-1997 1998-1999, 2003-
2009 Canada 1960-1968 1969-1978 1979-1999 2000-2009 
Chile 1960-1967 1968-1979 1980-1982, 1984-1996 1997-2009 
Czech 
Republic 
- - 1986-1993 1994-2011 
Denmark 1960-1968 1969-1993 - 1994-2011 
Estonia - - 1981-1982, 1985-1996 1997-2011 
Finland 1960-1968 1969-1986 1987-1995 1996-2011 
France 1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-1999 2000-2009 
Germany - - 1990-1997 1998-2011 
Greece 1961-1967 1968-1978 1979-2010 - 
Hungary 1960-1968 1969-1978 1979-1995 1996-2011 
Iceland 1960-1970 1971-1980 1981-1995 1996-2009 
Ireland 1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-1995 1996-2009 
Israel - 1975-1978 1979-1997 1998-2010 
Italy 1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-2002 2003, 2006-2010 
Japan 1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-1994 1995-2011 
Korea - - 1985-1994 1995-2011 
Luxembourg 1967-1970 1971-1978 1979-1997 1998-2011 
Mexico - 1969-1973 1981-1983, 1985-1997 1998-2010 
Netherlands 1960-1968 1969-1978 1979-1995 1996-2011 
New Zealand 1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-1999 2000-2009 
Norway 1960-1968 1969-1985 1986-1995 1996-2011 
Poland 1960-1968 1969-1979 1980-1996 1999-2011 
Portugal 1960-1970 1971-1979 1980-2001 2002-2003, 2007-
2011 Slovak 
Republic 
- - 1992-1993 1994-2010 
Slovenia - - 1985-1996 1997-2010 
Spain 1960-1967 1968-1969, 
1971-1979 
1980-1998 1999-2011 
Sweden 1960-1968 1960-1986 1987-1996 1997-2010 
Switzerland 1960-1968 1969-1994 - 1995-2010 
Turkey Data not 
available 
Data not 
available 
Data not available Data not available 
United 
Kingdom 
1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-1999 2001-2010 
United States 1960-1967 1968-1978 1979-1998 1999-2010 
 
18 ICD Coding of the Dependent Variable 
 ICD-7 ICD-8 ICD-9 ICD-10 
Diseases of the 
Circulatorys System 
330-334, 400-468 390-4358 390-459 I00-I99 
Iscaemic Heart 
Disease 
420-422 410-414 410-414 I20-I25 
Acute Myocardial 
Infarction 
-  410 410 I21-I22 
Cerebrovascular 
Disease 
330-334 430-438 430-438 I60-I69 
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Appendix 3: OECD-variables  
19 Break in Series on Variables from OECD 
Australia 1968, 1979, 1998 
Austria 1969, 1980, 2002 
Belgium 1968, 1979, 1998 
Canada 1969, 1980, 2000 
Chile 1969, 1980, 1997, 
Czech Republic 1994, 
Denmark 1969, 1994 
Estonia 1997 
Finland 1969, 1987, 1996, 
France 1968, 1979, 2000 
Germany 1998 
Greece 1968, 1979, 
Hungary 1969, 1979, 1996, 
Iceland 1971, 1981, 1996, 
Ireland 1968, 1979, 2007, 
Israel 1979, 1998, 
Italy 1968, 1979, 2003 
Japan 1968, 1979, 1995 
Korea 1995 
Luxembourg 1971, 1979, 1998, 
Mexico 1998 
Netherlands 1969, 1979, 1996 
New Zealand 1968, 1979, 2000 
Norway 1969, 1986, 1996, 
Poland 1969, 1980, 1999 
Portugal 1971, 1980, 2002, 
Slovak Republic 1994 
Slovenia 1997 
Spain 1968, 1980, 1999 
Sweden 1969, 1987, 1997 
Switzerland 1969, 1995, 
United Kingdom 1968, 1979, 2001, 
United States 1968, 1979, 1999, 
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 20 Age structure of population (2010) used to compute age-standardized death rates 
Age (years) Population 
0 1.28 
1-4 5.04 
5-9 6.16 
10-14 6.20 
15-19 6.62 
20-24 6.77 
25-29 7.01 
30-34 6.94 
35-39 7.17 
40-44 7.10 
45-49 7.11 
50-54 6.60 
55-59 5.98 
60-64 5.40 
65-69 4.21 
70-74 3.58 
75-76 2.88 
80-84 2.13 
85+ 1.82 
Total 100.00 
